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Abstract 
This paper aims to investigate the change in corporate debt levels in South Africa from 1994 
to 2016 as well as analyse certain factors that play a role in the decision making of 
corporates when it comes to the all-important decision of capital structure. The study uses 
data from large capitalisation, retail and food producing firms listed on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange. Four different leverage measures are used to determine the change in 
capital structure over the period under review as well as six of the most common 
determinants of capital structure used in literature.  
The analysis shows that South African corporates have drastically increased their appetite 
for debt funding compared to equity funding over the last two decades. Large capitalisation 
stocks reflected the largest increase in the use of debt, whilst food producers showed the 
smallest yet still significant increase in debt. Analysis has also shown that firms have 
changed their maturity profile of their debt significantly since the 2008 financial crises. 
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This paper aims to determine how corporate leverage has changed from 1994 to 2016 
given the backdrop of the fundamental economic changes that South Africa has gone 
through over this period. A total of 68 firms from three different sectors namely large 
capitalisation stocks, retail firms and food producers were sampled. This paper forms 
part of a larger study thus other sectors will be covered by different authors.   
The research conducted is quantitative in nature and relies on data extracted from IRESS 
as well as Bloomberg. Four different measures of leverage are used to analyse the 
capital structure decision of corporates: Total Debt to Book Value of Equity, Total Debt 
to Market Value of Equity, Total Liabilities to Book Value of Equity and Total Liabilities to 
Market Value of Equity. 
The study is structured around two questions. Firstly, how has the capital structure of 
South African firms changed from 1994 to 2016 and secondly what are the catalysts of 
this change? 
This study is inspired by Graham, Leary and Roberts’ (2015) study on leverage of United 
Sates (US) listed firms from 1915 to 2015. This study focused on how capital structure 
has changed in the US over the last century as well as analysing drivers of this change 
in capital structure. The authors found that leverage has drastically increased over the 
last century. The aggregate leverage for non-regulated firms (firms excluding banks and 
financial stocks) was found to be between 10% and 15% from 1920 to 1945, and between 
11% and 35% from 1945 to 1970. Since 1970 the aggregate leverage has been hovering 
around 35%, peaking at 47% in 1992.  
The authors found that neither firm characteristics nor the relationship between these 
characteristics and leverage ratios explain much of the increase in leverage over the last 
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decade. They however found that corporate tax rate, reduction in economic uncertainty, 
growth in financial intermediation and a large reduction in government borrowings are 
credible explanations to this change in capital structure.     
The economic environment in South Africa has drastically changed over the last couple 
of decades which forms the backdrop of this study as well as the main catalyst around 
the change of capital structure by corporates in South Africa.  
By the mid 1980’s South Africa had numerous trade and financial sanctions imposed 
upon the country by some of the world’s largest economic powerhouses such as the 
USA, Japan and Europe. Due to these sanctions a substantial amount of foreign 
investment was withdrawn from South Africa.  
The effects of this on South Africa were almost immediately noticeable. In the years 
preceding 1974 South Africa’s GDP grew an average of 4.9% per year but from 1974 to 
1987 GDP growth declined to 1.8% per year (Levy, 1999). 
A further noticeable effect the sanctions had on the SA economy was that of external 
borrowings. From 1940 to 1984 SA ran an account deficit to GDP of 2% - 3%. These 
were offset by substantial capital inflows. This dependence on foreign capital left South 
Africa vulnerable to shifts in lending. A large shift occurred from 1976 to 1980 where net 
foreign capital outflow averaged 2.3% which left South Africa dependent on the 
willingness of foreign lenders to refinance their debt (Levy, 1999). 
According to Hefti & Staehelin-Witt (2002) the massive capital outflows could be 
attributed to three factors. Firstly, the political unrest surrounding the Sharpeville 
massacre of 1960 and the Soweto unrest of 1976 which led to a national state of 
emergency in 1985/6 as large economic players imposed sanctions on South Africa.  
In 1994 the first democratic election took place and Nelson Mandela was elected as the 
new president of South Africa.  
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In 1996 the Bond Exchange of South Africa (BESA) received their licence which 
increased the accessibility of capital for South African corporates. Over the period of 
1998 to 2010 we saw the long bond rate decline from an average of 18.3% to 8.3% 
therein increasing the attractiveness of raising debt for corporates. In 1994 roughly R186 
billion worth of bonds was in circulation versus the R2 trillion in issuance at the end of 
2016, representing a growth in value of 975% over the last 22 years.  
Over the last three decades we have also seen a drastic decrease in the prime lending 
rate in South Africa which peaked at 25% in the late 1980’s whilst stabilising at between 
8% - 10% since 2010.  
All four measures of leverage showed an increase in the use of debt by South African 
corporates over the period of consideration with total debt to book value reflecting a 
considerable increase of over 146%. It is thus clear that the economic changes in South 
Africa over the last couple of decades have increased the appetite for debt funding. 
There has also been a clear change in the maturity profile of debt that firms are using. 
This change has especially been significant since 2008 where results have shown a vast 
increase in the use of long term debt relative to short term debt.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 covers the literature review which includes 
the theory surrounding capital structure decision making, determinants of capital 
structure, trend of leverage in the United States, United States and South Africa interest 
rate environment as well as the origin of South Africa’s debt market. Data sources as 
well as the methods used are covered in section 3 and 4. Section 5 covers the results 






2. Literature Review 
 
The optimal capital structure of a firm for the benefit of shareholder wealth has been the 
subject of extensive research and debate amongst academics in the field of finance. 
Research stemming from almost 50 years of study surrounding this topic, initiated by 
Modigliani & Miller (M&M) in 1958, the numerous contrasting opinions formed throughout 
subsequent years and the still ever elusive ‘golden ratio’ for the optimal capital structure for 
maximising shareholder wealth illustrates the sheer depth and complexity of this topic.  
This paper will focus on analysing a sample of shares on the Johannesburg stock exchange 
to ascertain and therein explain any trends that may exist in the use of leverage (with a focus 
on debt rather than equity financing) during the period 1994 to 2016. The fundamental 
concept of capital structure theory in the form of M&M irrelevance theory, agency theory, 
trade-off and pecking order theory should first and fore most be understood before moving 
to more specific literature on the topic.   
Furthermore, which operational factors have a material impact on the capital structure 
decisions of firms on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) will be analysed and a brief 
discussion will be presented regarding the attributes and different theories of the 
determinants of capital structure as found in the literature.  
 
2.1 Capital Structure Theory 
 
M&M work arguably forms the foundation for the formulation of the optimal capital structure 
within firms. The very nature of the theorems and assumptions concluded during the early 
work of M&M has earned the theoretical title of ‘the capital structure irrelevance theory’ or 
‘The Irrelevance Theory’ in short – the reasons for which shall become apparent in the 
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following synopsis of this theory and thus, given the above, aptly forms the beginning of this 
paper.  
Figure 1 below graphically illustrates the different capital structure theories and the impact 
the authors believed this had on the value of the firm. There are four main capital structure 
theories. M&M believe that capital structure has no impact on the value of the firm. “Trade- 
off, pecking order and agency theory however believe that changes to the capital structure 
makeup will have a material effect on the value of the firm (Xhaferi & Xhaferi 2015)”.  
 









(Xhaferi & Xhaferi 2015) 
 
2.1.1 Irrelevance theory  
 
As referred to above the M&M’s paper of 1958 arguably forms the basis of modern thinking 
on the capital structure decision that firms are faced with. Based on their theorems and 
Capital Structure 
Theories 
Has an impact on firm’s 
value 
Has no impact on firm’s 
value 
Trade-off Theory 
Pecking order Theory 
Agency Theory 
M &M  
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assumptions, expanded upon further below, their theory is often referred to as the capital 
structure irrelevance theory.  
The M&M theory is divided into two propositions. Proposition one looks at how a change in 
capital structure affects the value of the firm, and proposition two looks at how a change in 
capital structure affects the required rate of return of a firm.  
M&M however made a few key assumptions in their theory - no corporate taxes, equal 
corporate and private lending costs, no transaction costs, no bankruptcy costs and 
symmetry of market information. 
Under assumption one the value of a firm is not affected by changes in capital structure. 
The rationale behind this is that the cash flow of the firms has not changed, thus no change 
in value. Many academics have used the phrase, “it does not matter how you slice the pie 
(which mix of debt or equity is used) the size (value of the firm) of the pie stays exactly the 
same”.  
Proposition two looks at the firms cost of capital. M&M argue that a firm’ cost of capital stays 
constant regardless of the firm’s capital structure. The rationale behind this theory is that if 
a firm increases its debt financing, due to the lower cost of raising capital, it would 
subsequently increase the return that equity holders required due to the extra risk that is 
being taken on (Myers 2001).  
M&M then relaxed some of their assumptions to see how their theory would hold. Firstly, 
they relaxed the assumption of no corporate taxes. Interest on debt is tax deductible thus 
when a firm adds debt to its capital structure it reduces taxes. This reduction in taxes will 
subsequently increase the cash flow of a firm but also decrease net income. Thus, by adding 
the present value of the interest tax shield the value of the firm increases. Therefore, under 
this assumption, to derive the greatest value of the firm a company should simply use 100% 
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debt financing. However, it should be noted that there is no bankruptcy cost considered 
above. 
Under proposition two (WACC), when the assumption of no corporate taxes is relaxed, the 
cost of debt goes down due to the tax deductibility of the interest payments. Purportedly 
then under this assumption the more debt that is added to the capital structure of a firm, the 
more the firm can decrease its’ WACC.  
M&M then further relax their assumptions by including corporate taxes and bankruptcy 
costs. As leverage increases (more debt relative to equity capital) the probability of 
bankruptcy goes up with the increasing interest payment that is due on this debt. The use 
of more debt creates a larger income tax shield but also increases the bankruptcy costs 
which then offsets the gain from the interest tax shield.  Under proposition two the benefits 
of the additional savings from the tax shield is offset by the increase in bankruptcy cost, 
which will increase the cost of equity dramatically and push the WACC upwards again.  
 
2.1.2 Agency Theory 
 
“Being the manager rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be 
expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the 
partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Negligence and profusion, 
therefore, must always prevail, in the management of the affairs of such a company” – “An 
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations” Adam Smith (1776). 
Two Hundred years later Jensen and Meckling re-examined and extended Smith’s insight 
into what is referred to today as ‘agency theory’. “Agency theory or principal-agent model 
arises from the friction between one or more persons (principals) and another person (the 
agent) (Jensen & Meckling 1976)”. In the corporate environment, the principals can be the 
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shareholders of a corporation and the agents being management shareholders appoint to 
manage their corporation. The theory states that if both parties are utility maximizers, in that 
they want to maximise total value from available money, then the probability that the agent 
will not always act in the best interest of the principal could become common, thus causing 
a divergence in the interest between these two parties (Jensen & Meckling 1976).   
Myers (2001) argues that this arises from the fact that managers are never fully accountable 
for the cost of their actions unless they are both manager and owner, and that there is no 
pure, observable measure of performance for managers. 
Jensen & Meckling purported that debt could be used as a tool to solve potential conflicts in 
this principal-agent relationship, furthermore contending that the optimal capital structure is 
a result of two divergences that arise from this principle- agent relationship.  
Therefore, in accordance to the above contention by Jensen & Meckling a significant amount 
of debt on the balance sheet will increase the bankruptcy cost to a level where it forces 
managers to perform. A high bankruptcy cost in turn generally means that managers have 
a higher risk of losing their jobs and subsequently their remuneration. This is subsequently 
seen as a sufficient threat to incite managers to increase cash flow to service the interest 
payment on the debt, be more productive and efficient through less wastage and in turn lead 
to better decision making when choosing investment projects that will maximise the value of 
the firm, therein toeing the line with the needs of shareholders (Jensen & Meckling 1976).  
Leland (1998), however, argues that both M&M and Jensen & Meckling’ research falls short 
in two critical dimensions. Firstly, he argues that the two approaches have not been fully 
integrated and secondly that both theories fail to offer a quantitative solution to the amount 




2.1.3 Trade-off Theory 
 
Trade-off theory suggests that the optimal capital structure of a firm is a ‘trade-off’ between 
the cost and benefit related to debt financing. The largest benefits of debt financing are the 
tax advantage and the reduction in agency cost through free cash flow. While costs include 
the increase in risk of financial distress (bankruptcy) and the increased monitoring and 
contracting costs associated with higher debt levels (Tong & Green 2005).  
Static trade-off theory suggests that firms identify a target debt to equity ratio and converge 
towards it over the longer term by changing the financing mix. Trade-off theory suggests 
that the benefit of risk associated with debt financing influences this target or “ideal” capital 
structure (Xhaferi & Xhaferi 2015). 
An interesting note is that the trade-off theory referred to in this paper originated through the 
adaptation of the M&M debate when their assumptions were relaxed. When M&M relaxed 
their assumptions and incorporated taxes into the original Irrelevance proposition, this 
created a benefit for debt in that it served to shield earnings from taxes (Frank & Goyal 
2007). “Since the firm’s objective function is linear, and there is no offsetting cost of debt, 
this implied 100% debt financing (Frank & Goyal 2007)”.  
However, Myers & Majluf (1984) claim that the trade-off theory fails to explain the strong 
inverse correlation between profitability and financial leverage, and posed the question that 
if the interest tax shield on debt is so attractive why then would firms with higher profits have 
lower debt.  
Fama & French (2002) highlight that bankruptcy cost is higher for less profitable firms as 
well as for firms that have higher earnings volatility. This forces firms of this type to use less 
debt financing (Fama & French 2002). 
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Research from Smith (1986) concluded that leverage increases transactions such as stock 
repurchases (exchange of debt for equity) by firms. These transactions are then perceived 
as good news by investors and subsequently results in an increase in the share price. Whilst 
all leverage decreasing transactions such as issue of common stock (exchange of equity for 
debt) were conversely perceived as negative. Per Smith (1986) this is further indication that 
investors appreciate the increase of debt due to the perceived value and benefit of the 
interest tax shield. 
Figure 2 below illustrates the level where a value maximising firm would operate. Value 
maximising firms would operate at the top of the curve by benefitting mostly from the interest 
tax shield on debt. Financial distress would however come second in relation to the benefit 
of this interest tax shield on debt (Shyam-Sunder & C. Myers 1998). 
 
Figure 2: Optimal Capital Structure under the trade-off theory 
 




Hovakimian et al., (2004) conducted a study on the choice between debt and equity. The 
study suggests that past profit and cash flows play a material role in the selected debt ratio 
of a firm and influences future financing decisions. They concluded that a firm’s stock price 
plays an important role in the choice of financing. (Hovakimian et al., 2004) 
 
2.1.4 Pecking Order Theory 
 
Pecking order theory differs from other capital structure theories in that it does not attempt 
to calculate an optimal capital structure, and instead asserts that the achieved capital 
structure by a particular firm is the end product of the different funding resources available 
to the firm (Tong & Green 2005). Pecking order theory does acknowledge the benefit of the 
interest tax shield and the threat of bankruptcy albeit as less important metrics for capital 
structure decision making.  
Pecking order theory further states that asymmetric information, which is when one party 
possesses greater information than the other, such that when management has more 
information than shareholders about the company and potential projects, it creates a 
hierarchy of costs in the use of external financing. New investments would be financed first 
by retained earnings, secondly by debt and lastly by equity.  
To better demonstrate this hypothesis, Myers and Majluf (1984) analysed a firm that had 
some of its assets on the balance sheet as well as potential opportunities and projects the 
firm could partake in for future growth. One assumption made was that managers would 
always put funds towards projects that will have a positive net present value (NPV). They 
further argued that managers would always act in the best interest of current shareholders 
and thus would not raise equity capital if they knew their shares were undervalued, and only 
look to the market for financing when their shares were fairly valued or overvalued. The 
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result of management having this asymmetric information is that the market inevitably 
perceives a new issuance of shares as negative news. This then forces the share price to 
drop and therein negatively affecting current shareholders. 
Debt issuance however would then have a contrary indication on the market - if we were to 
agree that managers would always act in the best interest of current shareholders. A debt 
issuance would then imply that managers felt their shares were undervalued. 
The above then advocates the argument that internal financing will always be used as a 
primary source of financing, followed by debt financing where the extra debt issuance is not 
perceived to be too expensive (drastically increasing bankruptcy cost) whereby 
management would then turn to equity financing.  
A comparison of the separate research conducted by Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001) 
and Donaldson (1961) yielded similar results, with both studies confirming that firms tend to 
accumulate profits and losses that are consistent with the pecking order theory. 
 
2.2 Determinants of Capital Structure 
 
In understanding the various factors involved in the capital structure decisions of firms and 
to determine which factors have historically shown to be the most reliable explanation of this 
decision, it is pertinent to analyse previous academic research conducted in conjunction with 
the capital structure theories presented above and how these theories correlate to findings 
in practice. 
Toy, et al., (1974) study on capital structure tested three financial performance indicators – 
growth, measured as a logarithm of total assets; profitability, measured as earnings over 
total assets; and risk, measured as the coefficient of variation of earnings. The effects of a 
change in these indicators on the leverage ratio of firms applying its trade in the 
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manufacturing sector were observed. Total debt divided by total assets calculated at book 
value was used as a dependent variable in their model. The study was conducted across 
Norway, USA, Holland, Japan and France with a sample consisting of 816 firms spanning 
from 1966-1972. Toy et al., (1974) hypothesised, based on theoretical support, that firms 
with high growth rates, ceteris paribus, should have higher financial leverage and firms with 
high earnings, ceteris paribus, should have lower financial leverage. This in part was due 
primarily because of the use of internal funding to fund projects before looking elsewhere 
for funding – corresponding then with the pecking order theory. Finally, they hypothesised 
that firms with higher earnings risk, ceteris paribus, tend to have less leverage due to the 
uncertainty in their earnings. Toy et al., (1974) found that these three determinants varied 
with respect to the effects on leverage based on the firms’ domicile. Growth rate in assets 
had a large effect on leverage in the United States and Japan but minimal affect in Norway 
and Holland. Earnings risk was considerable in Norway, Japan and the United States but 
not in Holland (Toy et al., 1974). Risk in earnings positively correlated to debt ratios, contrary 
to the author’s initial beliefs. The differences in findings between countries based on debt 
levels was put down to the reactions each of these countries have various financial 
performance measures. Reaction to difference in the earnings rate variable is generally the 
most important differentiation factor among countries, whilst neither growth rate of assets or 
earnings risk is very helpful in explaining these cross-national differences. The authors 
concluded that their findings could potentially open opportunities for further research, 
especially research probing on country specific factors.   
Titman & Wessels (1988) analysed eight determinants in their research to explain capital 
structure decision making. Their data included 469 firms over the period of 1974 to 1982. 
The authors used six different debt ratios as dependent variables based on some theories 
having different empirical implications regarding different types of debt instruments. Long 
Term, short term and total debt to market and book values of equity were used to calculate 
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the leverage of the chosen firms in this study. The authors used asset structure, non-debt 
tax shield, growth, uniqueness, industry classification, size, earnings volatility and 
profitability as determinants to try and ascertain the effect on the firm’s debt-equity choice. 
Asset structure is thought to influence the capital structure decision of firms with assets that 
can be used as collateral, such as property, and that these firms then tend to issue more 
debt. A non-debt tax shield, such as the deduction on depreciation and investment credits, 
act as a substitute for the tax benefit of debt finance. Thus, it is believed that firms with large 
non-debt tax items use less debt in their capital structure. Growth as a determinant is derived 
from the agency theory where it is believed that equity-controlled firms are more inclined to 
invest in suboptimal projects to expropriate wealth from the firm’s bondholders. This cost 
associated relationship tends to be higher for firms that are in a growth cycle with a large 
scope of future investment opportunities and as such expected growth should be negatively 
correlated to debt levels. Firms that produce a very specific or unique product tend to have 
suppliers and workers with very specific skill sets, resulting in relatively high costs for all 
parties in the event of liquidation. Therefore, firms with unique products tend to have lower 
debt levels to limit that cost of bankruptcy. Titman & Wessels, (1988) succinctly state that 
“Firms that produce products that require specialised servicing and spare parts will find 
liquidation especially costly”. This then suggests that firms that manufacture machines and 
equipment would have lower levels of leverage. Larger firms however tend to have more 
diversified income streams and are thus less likely to be faced with a bankruptcy decision. 
It is believed that the larger the firm is, the more the firm tends to be able to issue debt at a 
lower cost and thus tends to be more highly leveraged. Firms with higher volatility in their 
earnings will tend to lower debt levels due to the risk associated with not meeting interest 
payments. 
For all six debt ratios Titman & Wessels (1988) found that uniqueness, measured as 
Research and Development (R&D) over sales, had a negative effect. Short-term debt ratios 
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were found to be negatively correlated to firm size, which they determined as an indication 
of the importance of transaction costs to firms when analysing their funding options. The 
authors concluded that the non-debt tax shield, volatility, collateral value and future growth 
had no material effect on any of their debt ratios.   
Harris and Raviv (1991) conducted an in-depth study of nine past research papers on the 
different theories of capital structure and determinants of leverage. They particularly 
analysed the results presented by these authors in their studies and what these authors 
found the effect on the dependent variable (leverage) to be. Harris and Raviv’ findings are 
documented in Table 1 below where (N) represents the number of studies, (+) shows and 
















Table 1: Determinants of Capital Structure 
Capital Structure Determinant N + - 
Volatility 5 1 4 
Bankruptcy Probability 1 0 1 
Fixed Assets 5 5 0 
Non-Debt Tax Shield 4 2 2 
R&D Expenditure 2 0 2 
Advertising 2 0 2 
Profitability 5 1 4 
Size 6 2 4 
Free Cash Flow 1 0 1 
Uniqueness 1 0 1 
N represents the number of studies that used a particular determinant in their research. (+) and (-) 
represents the effect on leverage. 
 
A pertinent derivation from the table above is the lack of total unanimity amongst the authors 
of the research studied by Harris and Raviv. The lack of unanimity could be a result of the 
differing methods used amongst authors when calculating this data. Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) and De Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2007) offer a potential alternative when they 
concluded that capital structure movements could also be country specific. Certainly 
however, the absence of a definitive answer to the lack of unanimity illustrates the integrate 
and complex nature of the capital structure decision facing firms.   
Van der Wijst and Thurik (1993) conducted a study analysing the effect of five determinants 
on the capital structure of small cap firms applying their trade in the retail sector. The author 
used data from Germany for the period of 1955 to 1977 and analysed 27 different shop 
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types. The variables used by Van der Wijst and Thurik (1993) included firm size, non-debt 
tax shield, bankruptcy cost, agency cost and return on investment. Van der Wijst and Thurik 
(1993) made use of long term, short term and total debt to total assets as the three 
dependent variables in their study. The authors found that all the variables, apart from the 
non-debt tax shield, appeared to have a material impact on the chosen debt ratios with the 
non-debt tax shield being inconclusive. Evidence, contrary to the author’s hypotheses, 
showed the chosen variables had a larger impact on the maturity of debt used by these 
smaller firms than the actual leverage used. Short-term debt funding increased in popularity 
in the latter part of the study, where long-term debt funding decreased. The authors 
concluded that research on small cap firms has largely been overlooked by finance 
professionals and a lot more research in this sector is needed.  
Rajan and Zingales (1995) conducted an international study involving 31 countries from 
1982 to 1991 with the objective of discerning whether the capital structures of these 
countries followed the G-7 (US, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, UK and Canada). Rajan and 
Zingales tested four capital structure determinants - tangibility of assets, market-to-book 
ratio, firm size and profitability. The authors found that movements in tangibility had a 
material impact on leverage. Firms with higher tangibility could turn assets into cash quicker 
to cover the debt in the case of increased bankruptcy risk. The authors found that the impact 
was much larger in Japan than anywhere else examined. The market-to-book ratio was 
negatively correlated to leverage. Rajan and Zingales concluded that firms with a high 
market-to-book ratio were more inclined to issue stock rather than increase debt financing, 
thus decreasing the leverage ratio. The effect of firm size on leverage varied largely by 
country, with a predominantly negative correlation as observed by Titman & Wessels (1988). 
This is contrary to their hypothesis and the authors concluded that they did not understand 
the correlation between firm size and leverage. 
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Pandey (2001) examined the influence of profitability, growth, risk and tangibility on the 
capital structure of Malaysian companies from 1984 to 1999 using a sample size of 106 
firms. They divided debt into three categories - short-term, long-term and total debt and 
subsequently ran the regression on all three dependent variables. Financial stocks however 
were excluded from this study as the corporate structure of these firms tended toward 
different determinants. The time line of this study was divided into four periods, a market 
downturn, market upturn, stability and growth phase to test for differences in debt ratios due 
to economic fluctuations. Pandy (2001) found that firms in Malaysia had very low levels of 
debt (average debt ratio over a 12-year period of 15%). It was also found that corporates 
did not increase their debt levels during times of economic growth but increased their debt 
levels in times of economic downturn. The author found that growth and size were positively 
correlated with all three debt ratios and profitability and tangibility were negatively correlated. 
Risk (volatility in earnings) was negatively correlated to long term debt ratios but positively 
correlated to short term debt ratios. Pandey (2001) concluded that the availability of data 
was a major constraint in this study and as more data becomes available a revised study 
would be beneficial in identifying additional determinants.  
A study of 6000 Swedish firms from 1992 to 2000 by Song (2005) found that Swedish firms 
were highly leveraged with a mean ratio of total liabilities over total assets of approximately 
80%. Total debt to assets had a mean of 67%, whilst total debt to capital had a mean of 75% 
over the period of study. It was also found that Swedish firms preferred to utilise short term 
debt. Song (2005) included eight determinants in the study - tangibility, non-debt tax shield, 
profitability, size, expected growth, uniqueness and income variability. The author found 
tangibility to be highly significant to all three of the debt measures used. Tangibility reflected 
a positive relationship to all debt ratios but found it to be negatively correlated to short-term 
debt which connects with the matching principle: long term debt is used to finance fixed 
(tangible) assets whilst non-fixed assets are financed with short term debt. Non-debt tax 
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shield did not reflect any statistically significant result with respect to total debt but when 
broken down by maturity reflected a positive relationship to short term debt and a negative 
relationship to long term debt. Profitability was found to be negatively correlated to all three 
leverage measures which relates to the pecking order theory. Size was found to be the most 
significant determinant of capital structure with a positive correlation to both total debt and 
short-term debt but negatively correlated to long term debt. The expected growth and 
uniqueness determinants revealed either little or no statistical significance and income 
variability was approximately zero in respect of its statistical significance.   
Haung and Song’ (2006) study of 1200 Chinese listed firms from 1994 to 2003. An 
interesting finding from this study was the environment in which these firms operate and the 
structural differences they face. A large portion of Chinese listed firms were state owned 
before being taken public. Even though these firms are now privately owned, the state still 
owns a large portion of the equity, giving them controlling right. “The Chinese economy is 
also in a transition phase, moving from a command economy to a market economy (Haung 
and Song, 2006)”. The authors concluded that even though the Chinese economy has a 
very different structure, the factors that influence capital structures of a firm remain the same. 
Haung and Song (2006) found that profitability, non-debt tax shield, managerial 
shareholding and company size have a negative relationship to debt ratios, but that 
tangibility and effective tax rate was positively correlated to the debt ratios implemented. 
“State shareholding or institutional shareholding had no significant effect on capital structure 
(Haung and Song, 2006)”.  
De Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2007) studied 11 845 firms across 42 countries (evenly 
dispersed between developed and emerging countries), with a chosen sample period, based 
on availability of data, from 1997 to 2001. The six firm-specific determinants of leverage 
used in this study were tangibility, risk, size of firm, tax rate, profitability and liquidity. De 
Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2007) results showed that the mean long-term debt ratio of all the 
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firms observed was 12.9% with a median of 11.9%. Industrialised countries had a mean 
leverage ratio of around 10% with the mean ratio for developing countries being 
approximately 15%. De Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2007) concluded that there are clear 
indications of direct and indirect effects on leverage based on the firm-specific determinants 
used in this study. Furthermore, De Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2007) found that the effect of 
these determinants on leverage varied by country, with some cases exhibiting large 
discrepancies between the results and theoretical predictions. When the authors shifted the 
focus to country-specific factors that had a direct impact on leverage they found that 
creditor’s rights protection, bond market development and GDP growth rate had significant 
effects on the country mean leverage ratio. Therein implying that firms in countries with a 
better legal environment and a stable, healthier economic environment are likely to not only 
take on more debt but the firm-specific determinants are also reinforced (De Jong, Kabir and 
Nguyen, 2007). 
Frank & Goyal (2009) conducted a study on US publicly traded firms from 1950 to 2003 to 
analyse which factors exhibited the most influence on capital structure. The capital structure 
determinants used in this study were median industry mean, market-to-book, tangibility, 
profit, log of assets and expected inflation. Frank & Goyal (2009) found six factors that could 
succinctly sum up the data. They found that firms that operate in industries where the mean 
leverage is high, firms that have a substantial number of fixed assets and larger firms tend 
to have higher debt ratios. When firms expect inflation to be high they tend to increase 
leverage to ensure that they can create inflation plus returns. Furthermore, firms with high 
market-to-book and that operate on high profit margins tend to have less leverage. Frank & 
Goyal (2009) also found that firms that pay a dividend tend to have lower leverage ratios 
than firms that did not. Determinants such as market-to-book asset ratio, firm size and 
expected inflation is viewed as forward looking leverage indicators whilst industry mean, 
tangibility and profitability are backward-looking leverage indicators (Frank & Goyal, 2009). 
 
29 
Psillakii and Daskalakis (2009) analysed the determinants of capital structure of SME’s in 
Greece, France, Italy and Portugal from 1998 to 2002. They compared country specific 
characteristics, asset structure, firm size, profitability, risk and growth to leverage.  The study 
by Psillakii and Daskalakis (2009) yielded conclusions contrary to that of their peers. They 
found that firm size does have a positive relationship with regards to the leverage ratio where 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) & Titman & Wessels (1988) had found that it did not. Psillakii and 
Daskalakis (2009) also found that asset structure, profitability and risk were negatively 
correlated to leverage. Furthermore, they found that growth did not yield any statistical 
significance. Psillakii and Daskalakis (2009) concluded that there were similarities in the 
determinants of capital structure between these four countries and that these similarities 
could be attributed to very similar economies and legal structures. Furthermore, it was 
apparent that firm characteristics provided a superior explanation for the differences in 
capital structure than country specific characteristics. 
Graham, Leary and Roberts (2015) found that firm size had a limited impact on their 
respective leverage ratio but changes in government borrowing, macro-economic 
uncertainty and financial sector development had a material impact on the amount of 
leverage used.  
Oztekin (2015) conducted a study spanning 37 countries and 15 177 firms from 1991 to 
2006 to ascertain which characteristics explain the choice of leverage across the world. The 
author subsequently tried to establish which determinants of leverage were the most reliable 
in this explanation of the capital structure choice and found firm size, tangibility, industry 
mean leverage, profits and inflation to be the most prominent determinants of leverage 
across the world. 
Evgeny (2017) analysed the capital structure of listed firms in Russia from 2009 to 2015. 
The sample included 48 publicly traded firms but excluded financial firms due to the industry 
specific regulation. The Russian economy is exposed to rather unusual economic conditions 
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making this study rather interesting. Russia is subject to large and frequent economic swings 
due to changes in commodity prices and political and economic sanctions. This study is 
unique from its peers due to the author incorporating determinants that are very rarely used 
in other studies. The determinants used were business risk, uniqueness of assets, 
macroeconomic conditions and industry groups. Evgeny (2017) made use of two statistical 
measures - random-effect and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, to estimate and 
measure the industry impact on capital structure. Total debt to market value of capital 
(TLMV), total debt to book value of capital (TLBV), long-term debt to market value of capital 
(LLMV) and long-term debt to book value of capital (LLBV) were used as measures of 
leverage.  
Evgeny (2017) used 13 capital structure determinants and measured them against the 
sample of firms over the period. These determinants are business risk, profitability, firm size, 
growth opportunities, capital expenditures (CAPX), tangibility, uniqueness, average tax rate, 
depreciation, industry mean leverage, stock market returns, average lending rate and 
inflation rate. The author found that total debt measures increased substantially over the 
period but long-term debt measures only increased marginally. The correlation between the 
uses of market value of capital versus book value of capital was rather moderate with values 
between 56 per cent and 65 per cent. “This means that market value and book value of 
capital are not highly correlated and fairly consistent in measuring leverage (Evgeny, 2017)”.  
Business risk was positively correlated to all leverage measures with statistical significance, 
which does not conform to the principles of trade-off theory which asserts that firms will 
borrow less when business risk increases due to the higher expected cost of financial 
distress. Profitability was found to be negatively correlated to all leverage ratios which is in 
line with the assertion of pecking order theory. Growth opportunities were negatively 
correlated with low levels of significance. Tangibility of assets reflected mixed results 
compared to the leverage ratios and thus does not align to the agency theory which holds 
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that firms with more tangible assets can borrow more easily and have lower cost of financial 
distress. Uniqueness showed a positive correlation which does not correspond to the 
assertion of trade-off theory that more unique assets will result in higher cost of financial 
distress. Tax expense showed no statistical significance to any leverage measure whilst 
mean industry leverage and inflation rate reflected positive relationships. Evgeny (2017) 
concluded that firm size, growth opportunities and industry mean were found to be the most 
reliable and influential determinants in Russia.  
 
2.3 Leverage and Corporate Performance 
 
A field of capital structure research that has been thoroughly covered in the last few decades 
has been the effect of capital structure decisions on corporate performance. This section will 
look at studies that divert slightly from the core focus of this paper but do however provide 
concrete evidence on why capital structure decision making has been such an important 
field of study.  
Krishnan & Moyer (1997) conducted a study on capital structure and performance of Asian 
corporations. The study included firms from Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Korea. In 
all countries, there was evidence that corporate structure does have an impact on 
performance.  
Majumdar & Chhibber’ (1999) study on firms in India and their capital structure and 
performance found a negative relationship between the level of debt in the capital structure 
and corporate performance, wherein an increase in debt decreased the performance of the 
firms. This finding by Majumdar & Chhibber’ (1999) does not follow the conventional western 
economic research which finds an increase in leverage resulted in superior performance. 
The authors concluded that this is due to financial/ lending institutions in India being 
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government owned. Due to financial institutions being government owned there is a lack of 
pressure exerted on the managers of borrowing firms to increase performance to access 
debt capital. 
Minton & Wruck (2001) conducted a study on low leverage firms and the reason for and 
theory behind their divergence from the use of debt. Their study was conducted over 25 
years from 1974 to 1998 and covered 5 613 firms. Minton & Wruck (2001) yielded five main 
outcomes. Firstly, they concluded that firms that appeared to be underleveraged migrated 
towards a pecking order style financial policy, where internal funds are primarily used for 
financing of projects. These firms tended to have larger cash on hand than the average firm 
thus making it easier for them to fund projects out of retained earnings. Secondly, they found 
that 50% of these firms increased their leverage ratio substantially after five years and over 
90% of these firms never returned to a conservative capital structure, thus making the 
conservative financial policy merely temporary. Thirdly, in conjunction with the temporary 
nature of these firms, as soon as the firms ran out of internal funds and required an outlay 
and costs increase, they tend to increase their long-term leverage ratio. Furthermore, Minton 
& Wruck (2001) found that these firms tend to have high market-to-book ratios and thus 
tended to apply their core business operations in industries that are subject to financial 
distress. Lastly, Minton & Wruck (2001) found that these firms do not consider the tax benefit 
of debt as a primary decision-making tool when constructing their financial policy.  
Zeitun & Tian’ (2007) study on capital structure and corporate performance focused on 
Jordan (Arab kingdom of Western Asia) concluded that capital structure does have a 
significant impact on corporate performance.   
San & Heng (2009) performed a study testing for any relationship between corporate 
structure decisions and financial performance before and after the 2007 crisis. The study 
focused on the 49 construction companies listed on the Malaysian stock exchange, which 
they further categorised into large, medium and small based on market capitalisation. The 
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results, akin to those of Zeitun & Tian (2007) confirmed the existence of a relationship 
between corporate structure and financial performance. However, the impact on 
performance was found to be different between the three market capitalisation categories. 
In the large category of corporations only return on capital and earnings per share had a 
significant relationship. Medium size companies had a significant relationship in operating 
margin only and only EPS was found to have had a significant relationship in small cap firms.  
Fosu (2013) conducted a study on 257 South African firms from 1998 to 2009 to determine 
the effect of capital structure on corporate performance as well as the influence of product 
market competition on the leverage-performance relationship. A large portion of South 
Africa’s listings on the JSE are controlled by groups with a pyramid ownership structure, 
thus it is hypothesised that South Africa’s agency cost will be much lower than that of the 
US and UK. In this sense, conflict will largely be between minority and majority shareholders 
rather than between managers and shareholders or creditors. Furthermore, South Africa 
exhibits a very high degree of concentration in market share thus reducing competition. 
Performance was measured by EBITDA divided by Total Assets and leverage was 
measured by Total Debt divided by total assets. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
which measures competition and the Boone Indicator (BI) which estimates the extent to 
which firms suffer lost earnings as result of being inefficient were used to model industry 
competition.  
Fosu’s (2013) model reflected a positive relationship between financial leverage and 
corporate performance. “These results suggest that financial leverage mitigates the agency 
costs of outside equity as noted in Jensen and Meckling (1976), particularly given the 
conservative use of debt among South African firms (Focus, 2013)”. HHI yielded statistically 
significant results and were negatively correlated whilst the BI yielded statistically significant 
results and were positively correlated.  
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Thus, Fosu (2013) concluded that firms in industries with a high concentration suffer adverse 
effects of an increase in leverage whilst firms in industries with low concentration will 
subsequently benefit from an increase in leverage.  
 
2.4 Trend of leverage in the United States 
 
In 2009 the United States went through one of the worst financial crises since the Great 
Depression of 1929. This however was not isolated to the United States but spilled over into 
a global financial crisis with numerous institutions requiring bailouts from Government.  
After the great depression of 1929 the United States government implemented strict financial 
regulations that worked successfully through to the 1960’s. After the 1980’s a rapid 
deregulation of financial structures combined with financial innovation stimulated powerful 
booms that all ultimately ended in crisis. The aftermath of these booms was trademarked by 
bailouts from government that allowed new expansion to begin and in turn ended in financial 
crises, and so the cycle continued (Crotty, 2009). 
This deregulation or light form of government regulation has been referred to as New 
Financial Architecture (NFA) which is characterised by the integration of modern day capital 
markets and light government regulation of commercial and investment banks (Crotty, 
2009). 
The NFA system is structured in such a way that key personnel in financial institutions are 
incentivised to take excessive risk when financial markets are bullish. “Top investment bank 
traders and executives receive giant bonuses in years in which risk taking generates high 
revenue and profits. Profits and bonuses are maximised during a boom by maximising 
leverage, which in turn maximises risk (Crotty, 2009)”. Most employees are not required to 
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repay the bonus earned during boom periods when the inevitable crash occurs, even if they 
are aware that their actions are likely to cause a financial crisis (Crotty, 2009). 
One individual that profited highly from the 1980’s financial deregulation was a man named 
Michael Milken (who worked for a firm called Drexel Burnham). Benjamin Stein states, “If 
any American had a good idea they could bring it to Milken, get it funded, and try his hand 
at capitalism”. This funding was provided in the form of “junk bonds” which were 
characterised by high interest payments and very low credit ratings. This was perceived as 
good for the United States as it would enhance production efficiency, accelerate 
technological progress and increase competitiveness in world markets. This large issuance 
of “junk bonds” was well received by Michael Jensen, a well-known Harvard professor, who 
was of the view that it would make corporations more responsive to international 
competition. This led to a substantial number of firms, who otherwise would have been 
denied access to credit, bulking up their balance sheet with large amounts of high yielding 
debt (Adams, 1993). 
By the end of 1990 one-fifth of all retailing industry debt, a quarter of all airline debt and half 
of all casino operations debt were in default, with corporate bankruptcies increasing 538% 
from 1986 to 1990. The impact of this increase in bankruptcies was felt by most players in 
the economic system including workers, retirees, bond holders, investors and taxpayers.  
Graham, Leary and Roberts (2014) conducted a study on United States listed corporates 
over the last century to determine how their capital structure had changed over this period. 
The study included all firms listed on the NYSE, Amex and NASDAQ. Multiple measures of 
leverage were used in this study including interest bearing debt to capital, total debt to book 
value of equity and total liabilities to assets. 
Modelling unregulated firms, it was found that firms had a relatively low and stable leverage 
ratio from 1920 through 1945 averaging between 11% and 17%. From 1946 through 1970 
leverage increased considerably to 35%. Levels of leverage then fluctuated between 1970 
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through 2010 reaching a high of 45% in 1990, subsequently supporting the studies by 
Adams (1993) regarding the high issuance of junk bonds during this period, and stabilising 
around 35% from the 2000’s onwards. Debt to market value of equity was found to follow 
the same trend but saw periods of increased fluctuation due to equity market valuations. 
The increase in leverage from 1920 through 1960 was largely due to increases in long term 
debt, whilst short term debt played a more significant role in the increase in leverage from 
1960 onwards. “This coincides with the growth in commercial paper issuance by nonfinancial 
firms in the wake of the 1966 credit crunch (Graham, Leary and Roberts, 2014)”.  
Total liabilities to total assets as a measure of leverage exhibited significant increases over 
the period - this measure was modelled to give an indication of the change in balance sheet 
items over the period. Total liabilities represented approximately 20% to 25% of assets in 
the 1920’s and 1930’s but had increased to over 65% by 1990. 
 
2.5 United States and South African Interest Rate Environment  
 
The United States federal open market committee sets the Federal Funds Rate which is the 
main instrument for the implementation of monetary policy. Banks borrow money for short 
periods (typically overnight) to fund transitory cash shortfall. The rate that these funds are 
borrowed at is called the fed funds rate. 
The United States Treasury regularly auctions short, intermediate and long-term debt 
instruments. The most common issues include 3-month and 6-month bills, 52-week bills, 2-
year notes, 5-year notes, 7-year notes, 10-year notes and 30-year bonds (Econoday, 2016).  
They are considered risk-free securities because the United States has never defaulted on 
its debt. Treasury securities are undoubtedly the most liquid of all fixed income securities.  
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Corporate bonds vary by company. Some companies have higher credit ratings than others. 
Bonds are rated by firms such as Moody’s, Standard & Poor and Citigroup. Bonds typically 
contain a rating of AAA to BBB- where AAA is seen as the most secure (lowest possibility 
of default) and BBB- the riskiest (highest probability of default) and junk bonds rated 
between BB+ to D (Econoday, 2016). 
High investment grade bonds offer interest rates that are higher than Treasury securities but 
lower than bonds from companies with poor credit ratings. Bonds usually trade at risk spread 
against a vanilla treasury security. The spread is usually based on factors such as duration 
and risk. 
Junk bonds are also known as high-yield bonds. These typically have a high probability of 
default and therefore investors are compensated for the higher risk with a higher yield 
(Econoday, 2016). 
Figures 3 and 4 below illustrate the relationship between the feds fund rate and the one and 
ten-year government treasury rate from 1953 to 2017. The treasury rate is the rate at which 
corporates can raise capital in the bond market. The highlighted columns on the graph 
illustrate the financial crises that America was subject to over the period of illustration. The 
effective federal fund rate rose from 0.80% in 1954 to an all-time high of 19.04% in 1981 









 Figure 3: Fed Funds Rate vs. United States Bond Rates  
 
(Source: Fred, 2016)  
 
Figure 4: United States Federal Funds Rate 
 





Figures 5 and 6 reflect the South African prime lending rate and bond market environment 
respectively. South Africa has followed much the same trend as the United States with a 
gradual increase in rates from 1950 to 1980 and a steady decline since 1998. It is thus 
hypothesised that firm leverage would have substantially increased since 1998 due to the 
decrease in the prime lending rate and the yield on the long bond. This decrease in the cost 
of debt would have increased the attractiveness of raising debt rather than equity capital for 
corporates. 
Figure 5: South African Prime Lending Rate 
 




Figure 6: Yield on Long-term Government Bonds from 1980 to 2016 
(Source: Inet BFA 2017) 
 
2.6 South-African Debt Market 
 
Bonds are debt securities that are used by both the private and public sector to raise capital 
for government expenditures and investment requirements. These bonds effectively operate 
and are traded on a centralised exchange known as a bond exchange. The Bond Exchange 
of South Africa (BESA) serves this function in South Africa and is responsible for regulating 
and monitoring the debt and interest rate derivative market. Despite the exchange being 
characterised as an Emerging Market Exchange it is still by in large the largest on the 
continent (Lui, 2013). 
The first corporate bond was issued in 1992, with the first government bond being issued 
two years later and the BESA receiving their licences in 1996. Currently there are 
approximately 1750 debt instruments listed on the BESA with a nominal outstanding value 
of roughly R2 trillion. 
The South African economy relies heavily on its domestic bond market, which is unique as 
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due in part to the historical political situation in South Africa when aggressive sanctions were 
imposed on the country in the 1970’s and 1980’s, which denied accessibility to the 
international financial market (Mboweni, 2006). 
The SARB established the Bond Market Association (BMA) in the mid 1980’s and 
subsequently managed it as a self-regulating organisation. The BMA received its exchange 
licenses in 1996 and evolved into the BESA. Through the course of the next twelve years 
the BESA made substantial improvements to the bond market development in South Africa 
such as the inclusion of electronic trading, matching and settlement, and improved efficiency 
and transparency (Mboweni, 2006). 
“The National Treasury continued to contribute to the development of the domestic bond 
market by introducing new types of bonds for which there was a demand in the market 
(Mboweni, 2006)”, this included inflation linked bonds, floating rate notes, a STRIP 
programme and retail bonds subsequently making it easier for smaller companies to raise 
capital.  
The growth in the bond market enticed the private sector into participating in bond issuance. 
In 1996 over 80% of bond issuances were attributed to government issuance. Government 
contribution has since declined to 66% by mid-2006 as a growing number of companies 
began to use debt instruments as a source of capital which has since resulted in some of 
the largest bond issuances in South Africa such as the MTN issuance in 2006 of R6.5bn, 
the Eskom R65 billion multi-term note issuance and Transnet’s R18.1Bn debt issuance 
(Mboweni, 2006). 
Figures 7 and 8 below illustrate the trend in the South African bond market over the last 
three decades. Figure 7 illustrates the decrease in the yield on long-term government bonds 
from a high of 18.3% in 1998 to an average yield of 8.3% from 2010 as raising capital through 
debt securities became more attractive for corporates. Figure 8 illustrates the rapid growth 
in the South African debt market. In 1994 roughly R186 billion worth of bonds were in 
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circulation versus the R2 trillion in issuance at the end of 2016, representing a growth in 
value of 975% over the last 22 years.  
Figure 7: Yield on Long-term Government Bonds from 1980 to 2016  
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Figure 8: Nominal Value of Bonds Traded in South Africa from 1994 to 2016  
 
        (Source: IRESS 2017) 
 
Figure 9 below illustrates the breakdown by sector of South Africa’s total bond market. Much 
of the market still consists of government debt followed by financials and state-owned 
enterprises. Government debt has increased substantially over the last few years due to a 
widening of the budget deficit. Financials have also added a substantial amount of debt over 




Figure 9: Composition of primary listings of debt securities on the JSE by instrument as at 
31 March 2016   
(Source: Debt Management Report 2015/16) 
 
2.7 Relevant Leverage Ratio’s 
 
This section will explore the different calculations of the leverage ratio that the authors used 
in their various studies. As noted by Harris & Raviv (1991) and Frank & Goyal (2009) there 
is a multitude of ways in which leverage can be calculated, which makes for challenging 
exercise when comparing and interpreting the research. Some authors made use of net debt 
(long plus short-term interest-bearing debt) whilst others used total liabilities (which included 
accounts payable, tax payable, deferred taxes, cash and other non-interest-bearing 

















of equity, others as book value of debt to market value of equity, still others as debt to market 
value of equity plus book value of debt (Harris & Raviv, 1991)”.  
Toy et al., (1974) defined the corporate debt ratio as a firm’s total debt divided by its total 
assets. Included in total debt (other than the obvious balance sheet items such as long and 
short-term interest bearing debt) were accounts payable, accruals and other short term debt. 
Similar calculations of the debt ratio were used by Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001) 
and Song (2005) in their studies. The formula used by these authors can be seen below. 
 





In their study of analysing the leverage ratio of US firms from 1962-1981 Harris and Raviv 
(1991) combined long term and short-term debt and divided this total by the total assets as 
a measure of leverage. The same ratio was used by Oztekin (2015) in his international study 
involving 15 177 firms from 37 different countries. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) viewed the broad ratio of total debt to total assets, as used by 
Toy et al., (1974) and Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001), as a bad indicator for leverage 
due to this ratio including non-financing items such as accounts payable, which is more for 
transaction purposes. Thus, the leverage ratio could be overstated when including these 
items. Given the above, the authors felt that a more appropriate ratio would be net debt (both 
long term and short-term interest bearing) to total assets, excluding accounts payable and 
receivable that are generally influenced by industry movements.  The formula can be seen 
below. 
 
Net Debt to Assets   =   






Titman & Wessels (1988) and De Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2007) used a ratio of long term 
debt over market value of total assets where total assets was calculated as the book value 
of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity. They argued that 
short term debt is influenced by different determinants, and the examination of total debt 
would yield unreliable results (De Jong, Kabir and Nguyen, 2007). The formula used by 
Titman & Wessels (1988) and De Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2007) can be seen below. 
 
Long Term Debt to Total Assets   =   
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑀𝑉 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 
Welch (2004) defined the actual corporate ratio as the book value of debt divided by the 
book value of debt plus the market value of equity. Welch argued for the appropriateness of 
using market based inputs as this is closely aligned to the inputs when calculating a firms 
WACC. 
Welch (2004) elaborates on this with the use of an interest coverage ratio (see below), which 
expresses interest on debt as a multiple of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT). The 
author found that firms with poor interest cover tend to reduce their leverage in the following 
years.   
 
Interest Cover Ratio  =   







Frank & Goyal (2009) reiterate that there are various measures and definitions of leverage 
in the literature and an author’s calculation of debt ratios differs whether market or book 
values are used and whether only long-term debt or total debt is used as the numerator. In 
their study, Frank & Goyal (2009) used four methods of calculating leverage which included 
total debt to market value of assets, total debt to book value of assets, long term debt to 
market value of assets and long-term debt to book value of assets.  
 
Table 2: Summary of Leverage Measures used in Literature 
Authors Leverage Ratio used 
Toy et al., (1974) 
Total Debt over Total Assets (at Book 
Value) 
Titman & Wessels (1988) 
Short Term Debt over BV of Equity 
Short Term Debt over MV of Equity 
Long Term Debt BV of Equity 
Long Term Debt MV of Equity 
Convertible Debt BV of Equity 
Convertible Debt MV of Equity 
Van der Wijst and Thurik (1993) 
Long Term Debt over BV of Equity 
Short Term Debt over BV of Equity 
Total Debt over BV of Equity 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
Non-equity Liabilities over Total Assets 
Debt over Total Assets 
Debt over Net Assets 
Debt over Capital 
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Interest Coverage Ratio 
All the above ratios were calculated using 
BV and MV for equity 
Pandey (2001) 
Short Term Debt over Capital 
Long Term Debt over Capital 
Total Debt over Capital 
All the above ratios were calculated using 
BV and MV for equity 
Haung and Song (2006) 
Long Term Debt over Capital 
Total Debt over Capital 
Total Liabilities over Capital 
De Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2007) Long Term Debt over MV of Total Assets 
Frank & Goyal (2009) 
Total Debt over MV of Assets 
Total Debt over BV of Assets 
Long Term Debt over MV of Assets 
Long Term Debt over BV of Assets 
Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009) Total Liabilities over Total Assets 
Graham, Leary and Roberts (2015) Total Debt over Capital 
Oztekin (2015) Total Debt over MV of Total Assets 
Evgeny (2017) 
Total Debt over MV of Capital 
Total Debt over BV of Capital 
Long Term Debt over MV of Capital 
Short Term Debt over BV of Capital 
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3. Data Sources 
 
Ratios were computed using yearly financial statements data extracted from IRESS for a 
sample consisting of 68 firms (which can be seen in Appendix 1), from 1994 until 2016 – or 
since the initial public offering (IPO). Firms with limited data or that have been suspended 
were removed from the sample. The sample consists of the JSE Top 40 largest listed 
companies measured by market capitalisation, excluding financial and property shares 
(which are covered in a different study), general retailers and food producers. The data was 
split into four subsamples and regression and data analysis was done on each sample. 
These four subsamples were as follows; total sample (consisting of all 68 selected firms), 
retail firms (consisting of 27 selected firms), food producers (consisting of 14 selected firms) 
and large capitalisation companies (consisting of 20 selected firms). 
The South-African prime interest rate, extracted from IRESS was used to measure the cost 




With increasing research in the field of capital structure theory and determinants, different 
opinions and methods of calculating leverage arise, each with its own pro’s and con’s. 
Therefore, appropriate comparisons between different studies becomes rather challenging 
and this study will utilise the most widely used ratio and determinants to enable an easily 
comparable set of results to that of past research. This study is quantitative in nature, whilst 
making use of different determinants of capital structure to ascertain how these determinants 
influence the use of debt and equity capital.   
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Studies with the objective of analysing the agency problem tend to use debt to firm value as 
the dependent variable. Interest coverage is most suitable when conducting studies on 
leverage and firms in distress (Pandy, 2001). Harris and Raviv (1991) noted the increasing 
challenge in interpreting capital structure research when this research differs in the 
calculation methods of some of these determinants. An illustration of this is the measuring 
of growth opportunities, which is measured by market value of the firm to the book value of 
assets. While large firms should have a large value in respect of this ratio, other potentially 
small firms whose asset base has appreciated significantly since purchase would also have 
a large ratio, thus creating difficulties when trying to interpret statistical results. (Harris & 
Raviv, 1991). 
Four alternative leverage ratios will be used as the dependent variable in this study. These 
will include total debt over book value of equity, total debt over market value of equity, total 
liabilities over book value of equity and lastly total liabilities over market value of equity. This 
corresponds with the studies by Titman & Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), De 
Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2007) and Graham, Leary and Roberts (2015). The four alternative 
leverage ratios can be seen below. Total debt will consist of only interest-bearing liabilities 
and thus only include items that could potentially increase the bankruptcy risk of a firm. Total 
liabilities of equity will include accounts payable, deferred taxes, dividends payable, tax 
payable and other long and short-term liabilities. Both the above ratios will be divided by 








Table 3 presents the leverage measures used in this study and the methods used in 
calculation. 
Table 3: Leverage measures 
Proxy Variable Calculation 
TDBV 
Total Debt to Book 
Value of Equity 
Long-Term Interest-Bearing Debt + Short-Term 
Interest-Bearing Debt / Total Book Value of Equity 
TDMV 
Total Debt to Market 
Value of Equity 
Long-Term Interest-Bearing Debt + Short-Term 
Interest-Bearing Debt / Total Market Value of Equity 
TLBV 
Total Liabilities to Book 
Value of Equity 
Total Liabilities / Total Book Value of Equity 
TLMV 
Total Liabilities to 
Market Value of Equity 
Total Liabilities / Total Market Value of Equity 
 
The determinants used in this study include firm size (calculated as the natural logarithm of 
sales), tangibility of assets (calculated as fixed assets over total assets), profitability 
(calculated as EBIT over total assets), growth (calculated as the natural Logarithm of total 
assets) and cost of raising debt (with the prime interest rate used as a benchmark). 
Table 4 presented below shows the capital structure determinants used in this study and 








Table 4: Capital Structure Determinants Measures 
Determinants Proxy Calculation 
Firm Size SIZE Natural logarithm of Turnover 
Tangibility of Assets TANG Fixed Assets (Property, plant & Equipment) / Total 
Assets 
Profitability PROF Earnings Before Interest and Tax (EBIT) / Total Assets 
Growth GROW Natural logarithm of Total Assets 
Cost of Debt CORD Prime Rate in South Africa 
SA Corporate Tax 
Rate 
 
TAX SA Corporate Tax Rate 
a) Growth  
Growth is calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets. Alternative growth calculations 
have been used in the literature. Titman & Wessels (1988) calculated growth using CAPX 
to Assets and R&D to Assets, but due to the limitation in data the natural logarithm of total 
assets will be used, corresponding with the study conducted by Toy et al., (1974) & Pandy 
(2001). The theory as to why growth in assets influences leverage is due to firms that find 
themselves in a high growth phase find it necessary to increase their assets base to keep 
up with the demand (Pandy, 2001). This growth in assets base needs to be funded in some 
way and thus we expect a positive relationship between growth and leverage. However, 
Titman and Wessels (1988) found no significant relationship between growth and leverage 
whilst Frank and Goyal (2009) found that the capital structure theories on growth tend to be 
uncorrelated.  
Trade-off theory predicts that growth will decrease the use of debt base due to growing firms 
placing a greater value on stakeholder co-investment, whilst pecking order theory 
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Profitability will be calculated as EBIT divided by Total Assets. Based on the 1963 paper by 
M&M, profitable firms tend to use more debt to get the full advantage of the interest tax 
shield and these firms also face lower risk in terms of bankruptcy (Frank & Goyal, 2009). 
From an agency theory perspective, debt, in terms of the discipline it forces onto managers, 
is more valuable as managers tend to waste this extra resource on projects and investment 
that do not meet the minimum required rate of return (Frank & Goyal, 2009). “For firms with 
high free cash flow or high profitability can use debt to restrain management discretion 
(Haung & Song, 2006)”. However, Pecking order theory asserts that the increase in 
profitability should decrease leverage as firms tend to first use internally generated funds 
before sourcing finance externally (Frank & Goyal, 2009).  
 
c) Firm Size 
Firm size is calculated as the natural logarithm of sales/revenue in this study. Larger firms 
tend to have diversified income streams, therein decreasing their risk and larger, older firms 
also tend to incur a lower direct cost of issuing debt or equity (Frank & Goyal, 2009). The 
author also found that under the agency theory, larger firms should have higher levels of 
debt. Pecking order theory also suggests that larger firms will tend to have higher debt ratios 
based on having more experience and information and a better opportunity to retain 
earnings (Frank & Goyal, 2009). Marsh (1982) found that larger firms tend to choose long-
term debt whilst smaller firms tend to use short-term debt. “Larger firms may be able to take 
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advantage of economies of scale in issuing long-term debt, and may even have bargaining 
power over creditors (Haung & Song, 2006)”. 
 
d) Tangibility  
Tangibility – the nature of assets is calculated as fixed assets divided by total assets. 
Tangibility is aligned toward the trade-off theory, which states that tangible assets act as 
collateral and provide security to lenders in the event of financial distress (Jense & Mekling, 
1976 & Pandy, 2001). It is thus expected that firms with higher tangible assets should have 
higher levels of debt. Frank & Goyal (2009) alluded to the fact that tangible assets are easier 
to value than intangibles, thus lowering the expected financial distress costs. The pecking 
order theory however makes the opposite predication. “Low information asymmetry 
associated with tangible assets makes equity issuance less costly (Frank & Goyal, 2009)”. 
Thus, based on the pecking order theory an increase in tangibility should be negatively 
correlated to debt ratios.  
 
e) Cost of Debt 
The South African prime interest rate is used as a benchmark to model the cost of debt. 
Ideally, the Johannesburg Interbank Agreed Rate (JIBAR) should be used, but due to a lack 
of historical data regarding this rate, the South African prime rate is used. Large corporate 
banks lend to institutions at the JIBAR rate plus some risk premium based on the institutions 
underlying risks. “Clients of retail banks are exposed to the prime interest rate when taking 
out an overdraft, car loan, and mortgage and there are debt structures in existence for 
institutions, which are linked a spread above or below prime” (West, 2008).  
The hypothesis of using a lending rate, such as prime, as a determinant of leverage has not 
yet been published in the literature. South African prime rate has decreased from a high of 
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23% in 1998 to a low of 8.50% in 2013. The decrease in this cost of borrowing should 
increase the appetite for more debt as the bankruptcy risk would be drastically decreased, 
which could be closely linked to the trade-off theory of debt. The decrease in the cost of debt 
would move the optimal debt level upwards to gain the same tax benefit in the low-cost 
environment, thus, we are anticipating that this decrease in rate should have an inverse 
correlation on the debt levels of corporates in South Africa.  
 
f) Corporate Tax Rate 
The effect of corporate tax rate on aggregate leverage is measure by the South African 
corporate tax rate which was at a peak of 37.80% in 2001 to the current low of 28%. “Interest 
payments are deducted from corporate income tax and therefore enjoy a tax advantage. 
Firms with higher corporate tax rates have an incentive to increase leverage (Gropp & Ebril, 
1997)”. Although all firms face the same statutory tax rate, effective corporate tax rate will 
differ from firm to firm based on certain accounting entries such as investment credits, 
accelerated depreciation or tax loss carry forwards (Gropp & Ebril, 1997). 
It is thus hypothesised that an increase in corporate tax rate would increase aggregate 
leverage of firms as firms would put more emphasis on interest deduction to shield profits 
from tax. A decrease in corporate tax rate would subsequently allow corporate to reduce 




This chapter focuses on the results obtained from the research into the leverage ratio and 
determinants of South Africa listed firms for the period of 1994 to 2016. A total sample of 68 
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JSE listed companies where sampled in this study comprising of large capitalisation stocks, 
retailers and food producers. Together these companies make up approximately 75% of the 
total market capitalisation of the JSE index. This section will look at the determinants of firm 
leverage as well has how leverage has change in the South African environment over time.  
 
5.1 Total Sample 
 
The total sample comprised of 68 companies listed on the Johannesburg stock exchange. 
Both debt to equity ratios increased significantly whilst total liabilities to equity ratios increase 
modestly over the period.  
TDBV increase from an average of 19, 36% (average debt to BV of equity from 1994 to 
1998) to 47, 65% (average debt to BV of equity from 2012 to 2016). That equates to an 
increase of 146, 13% over the period. TDMV of equity increase from an average of 13, 40% 
(average debt to MV of equity from 1994 to 1998) to 26, 26% (average debt to MV of equity 
from 2012 to 2016). That equates to an increase of 95% over the period.  
TLBV equity increase from 94, 71% (average total liabilities to BV of equity from 1994 to 
1998) to 127, 50% (average total liabilities to BV of equity from 2012 to 2016). That equates 
to an increase of 34.62%. TLMV equity increase from 68, 56% (average total liabilities to 
MV of equity from 1994 to 1998) to 71, 63% (average total liabilities to MV of equity from 
2012 to 2016). That equates to an increase of 4.48%.  
Figure 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 below present a graphical representation of the different 
leverage ratios under the period of consideration. Table 5 below presents the different 





Figure 10: Leverage Ratios’ of the Total Sample  
 
 







Figure 12: Total Liabilities to Book Value ratio of the Total Sample  
 
 





Figure 14: Total Liabilities of Market Value of the Total Sample  
 
 
Table 5: Yearly Leverage for Total Sample 
  TDBV TLBV TDMV TLMV 
1994 21,11% 106,30% 16,68% 96,75% 
1995 18,22% 97,33% 10,44% 56,20% 
1996 18,40% 96,94% 6,64% 46,05% 
1997 18,83% 84,52% 13,74% 64,99% 
1998 20,26% 88,48% 19,47% 78,82% 
1999 48,23% 134,88% 22,17% 86,17% 
2000 54,70% 158,74% 26,25% 105,94% 
2001 36,11% 127,59% 21,78% 100,14% 
2002 37,69% 124,15% 26,37% 101,30% 
2003 38,14% 123,93% 22,04% 94,71% 
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2004 49,84% 141,34% 16,18% 67,58% 
2005 31,62% 122,78% 10,49% 53,87% 
2006 56,41% 167,15% 17,45% 57,85% 
2007 46,66% 153,09% 18,14% 59,38% 
2008 60,59% 165,61% 41,67% 107,02% 
2009 61,35% 161,55% 57,09% 141,39% 
2010 49,25% 134,74% 28,12% 80,02% 
2011 45,75% 127,70% 26,05% 74,26% 
2012 38,98% 116,52% 23,59% 64,34% 
2013 47,28% 125,51% 28,26% 74,58% 
2014 51,20% 134,54% 23,90% 67,22% 
2015 52,57% 133,50% 31,54% 80,53% 
2016 48,21% 127,42% 24,01% 71,46% 
          
Average 41,36% 128,45% 23,13% 79,59% 
Min 18,22% 84,52% 6,64% 46,05% 
Max 61,35% 167,15% 57,09% 141,39% 
Std Dev 13,95% 23,37% 10,65% 22,16% 
Range 43,13% 82,63% 50,45% 95,33% 
 
Table 6, 7 and 8 below summarises the descriptive statistics, regression analysis and the 
correlations between the four leverage ratios used as well as the capital structure 
determinants. The average leverage ratio ranges from 23% to 128% based on the measure 
of leverage used with a standard deviation of between 10% and 23%.  
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Firm size reflects a positively correlation to all four leverage ratios with TDBV, TLBV and 
TDMV reflecting significant correlations at the 0.01 level. Tangibility is negatively correlated 
to all four leverage ratios but none shows statistical significance. Profitability reflects a 
positive correlation to TDBV and TLBV but negative correlation against TDMV and TLMV. 
Growth is positively correlated to all four leverage ratios with TDBV and TDMV showings 
statistical significance to the 0.01 level and TLBV showing statistical significance at the 0.05 
level. Cost of debt is negatively correlated to all four leverage ratios with TDBV and TLBV 
showing statistical significance. Corporate tax rate is negatively correlated to all four 
leverage ratios with TDBV, TLBV and TDMV showing statistical significance.  
 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of Total Sample  
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
TDBV 23 18.22% 61.35% 41.36% 13.95% 
TLBV 23 84.52% 167.15% 128.45% 23.37% 
TDMV 23 6.64% 57.09% 23.13% 10.65% 
TLMV 23 46.05% 141.39% 79.59% 22.16% 
SIZE 23 13.87 16.86 15.55 0.98% 
TANG 23 34.85% 42.44% 36.88% 1.78% 
PROF 23 9.64% 18.61% 13.16% 2.76% 
GROW 23 13.69 16.88 15.40 1.02% 
CORD 23 8.50% 23.00% 13.36% 4.17% 
TAX 23 28.00% 35.00% 29.96% 2.51% 












Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .860a .739 .642 8.35428% 
a. Dependent Variable: TDBV 








Square F Sig. 
1 Regressio
n 
3167.469 6 527.911 7.564 .001b 
Residual 1116.703 16 69.794   
Total 4284.172 22    
a. Dependent Variable: TDBV 

















t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant
) 
-40.545 184.613  -.220 .829 
SIZE 94.898 43.215 6.671 2.196 .043 
TANG .896 1.393 .115 .643 .529 
PROF -1.745 1.078 -.345 -1.619 .125 
GROW -85.928 39.461 -6.293 -2.178 .045 
CORD -.228 .748 -.068 -.304 .765 
TAX -2.589 1.798 -.466 -1.440 .169 









Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .787a .619 .476 16.91244% 
a. Dependent Variable: TLBV 












Square F Sig. 
1 Regressio
n 
7435.252 6 1239.209 4.332 .009b 
Residual 4576.488 16 286.030   
Total 12011.740 22    
a. Dependent Variable: TLBV 









t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant
) 
187.140 373.731  .501 .623 
SIZE 181.467 87.484 7.618 2.074 .055 
TANG -.451 2.821 -.034 -.160 .875 
PROF -1.771 2.182 -.209 -.812 .429 
GROW -173.307 79.884 -7.580 -2.169 .045 
CORD .234 1.515 .042 .154 .879 
TAX -5.836 3.640 -.628 -1.603 .128 











Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .771a .595 .443 7.94861% 
a. Dependent Variable: TDMV 








Square F Sig. 
1 Regressio
n 
1483.815 6 247.303 3.914 .013b 
Residual 1010.887 16 63.180   
Total 2494.702 22    
a. Dependent Variable: TDMV 











t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant
) 
42.892 175.648  .244 .810 
SIZE 85.630 41.116 7.888 2.083 .054 
TANG -.722 1.326 -.121 -.545 .593 
PROF -2.859 1.026 -.741 -2.788 .013 
GROW -79.226 37.544 -7.603 -2.110 .051 
CORD .432 .712 .169 .606 .553 
TAX -2.428 1.711 -.573 -1.420 .175 









Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .661a .437 .226 19.49885% 
a. Dependent Variable: TLMV 










Square F Sig. 
1 Regressio
n 
4720.743 6 786.791 2.069 .115b 
Residual 6083.284 16 380.205   
Total 10804.027 22    
a. Dependent Variable: TLMV 









t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant
) 
913.692 430.886  2.120 .050 
SIZE 111.372 100.863 4.930 1.104 .286 
TANG -4.153 3.252 -.334 -1.277 .220 
PROF -6.535 2.516 -.814 -2.597 .019 
GROW -130.112 92.101 -6.000 -1.413 .177 
CORD -.673 1.747 -.127 -.385 .705 
TAX -10.485 4.196 -1.189 -2.499 .024 




Table 8: Correlations between dependent variables and determinants of total sample 
 
 
5.2 Retail Firms 
 
The retail analysis comprises of 27 firms listed on the Johannesburg stock exchange. 
Average TDBV increase from 19.70% to 43.58% whilst average TDMV increased from 
9.45% to 15.77%. Average TLBV increased from 129.90% to 148.87% whilst average TLMV 
of debt decreased from 88.28% to 66.90%.  
Figure 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 below present a graphical representation of the different 
leverage ratios under the period of consideration. Table 9 below presents the different 
leverage rations broken down into yearly increment.  
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Figure 15: Leverage Ratios’ of Retail Firms 
 
 






Figure 17: Total Liabilities to Book value ratio to of Retail Firms 
 
 






Figure 19: Total Liabilities to Market value ratio of Retail Firms 
 
 
Table 9: Yearly Leverage for Retail Firms 
  TDBV TLBV TDMV TLMV 
1994 25,38% 144,96% 20,46% 134,75% 
1995 19,28% 133,56% 10,25% 82,10% 
1996 17,21% 142,96% 3,35% 55,30% 
1997 19,28% 114,56% 7,87% 85,63% 
1998 17,38% 113,47% 5,29% 83,65% 
1999 22,93% 114,80% 11,29% 104,92% 
2000 17,12% 127,59% 19,69% 145,63% 
2001 15,15% 118,96% 13,86% 136,95% 
2002 29,73% 128,42% 15,34% 124,67% 
2003 26,88% 129,72% 12,28% 123,49% 
2004 62,69% 182,67% 9,20% 82,84% 
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2005 29,73% 148,14% 10,03% 74,52% 
2006 39,23% 195,07% 12,71% 68,63% 
2007 30,41% 196,31% 10,69% 72,43% 
2008 41,94% 188,01% 26,95% 117,98% 
2009 44,18% 187,77% 66,61% 203,08% 
2010 30,08% 151,35% 13,74% 86,68% 
2011 32,38% 143,64% 15,66% 75,78% 
2012 33,71% 136,67% 12,88% 57,70% 
2013 40,60% 141,96% 15,66% 63,92% 
2014 49,22% 159,02% 16,58% 67,15% 
2015 49,14% 155,44% 15,14% 65,85% 
2016 45,22% 151,27% 18,61% 79,86% 
          
Average 32,12% 148,10% 15,83% 95,37% 
Min 15,15% 113,47% 3,35% 55,30% 
Max 62,69% 196,31% 66,61% 203,08% 
Std Dev 12,64% 26,07% 12,20% 35,85% 
Range 47,55% 82,84% 63,26% 147,78% 
 
Table 10, 11 and 12 below summarises the descriptive statistics and the correlations 
between the four leverage ratios used as well as the capital structure determinants. The 
average leverage ratio ranges from 15.83% to 148.10% based on the measure of leverage 
used with a standard deviation of between 12.20% and 35.85%.  
The results in the determinants of capital structure saw some deviations from the expected 
especially with regards to market value ratios. Firm size is positively correlated to TDBV, 
TLBV and TDMV but negatively correlated to TLMV. TDBV and TLBV showed both 
 
73 
statistical significant at the 0.01 level. Tangibility is positively correlated to TDBV but 
negatively correlated to TLBV, TDMV and LTMV.  Profitability is positively correlated to 
TDBV, TLBV and TDMV but negatively correlated to TLMV. TDBV showed statistical 
significance at a 0.05 level whilst TLBV showed statistical significance at a 0.01 level. 
Growth is positively correlated to TDBV, TLBV and TDMV but negatively correlated to TLMV. 
TDBV showed statistical significance at a 0.01 level whilst TLBV showed statistical 
significance at an 0.05 level. Cost of debt as well as corporate tax rate is negatively 
correlated to TDBV, TLBV and TLMV but positively correlated to TLMV.  In both instance 
TDBV showed statistical significance at a 0.01 level.  
 
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics of Retail firms  
Descriptive Statistics 





TDBV 23 15.15% 62.69% 32.12% 12.64% 
LTBV 23 113.47% 196.31% 148.10% 26.07% 
TDMV 23 3.35% 66.61% 15.83% 12.20% 
TLMV 23 55.30% 203.08% 95.37% 35.85% 
SIZE 23 12.92 16.64 15.22% 1.09% 
TANG 23 19.64% 26.88% 23.33% 1.94% 
PROF 23 1.75% 17.24% 11.75% 3.89% 
GROW 23 12.89 16.36 14.82% 1.07% 
CORD 23 8.50% 23.00% 13.36% 4.17% 
TAX 23 28.00% 35.00% 29.96% 2.51% 












Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .733a .537 .364 10.08% 
a. Dependent Variable: TDBV 








Square F Sig. 
1 Regressio
n 
1887.828 6 314.638 3.097 .033b 
Residual 1625.650 16 101.603   
Total 3513.477 22    
a. Dependent Variable: TDBV 











t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -104.347 120.917  -.863 .401 
SIZE -2.150 14.467 -.186 -.149 .884 
TANG -1.123 1.390 -.172 -.808 .431 
PROF -.016 .920 -.005 -.017 .987 
GROW 11.687 15.155 .989 .771 .452 
CORD -.625 .905 -.206 -.691 .500 
TAX 1.027 1.831 .204 .561 .583 









Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .845a .714 .607 16.34% 
a. Dependent Variable: LTBV 











Square F Sig. 
1 Regressio
n 
10676.427 6 1779.405 6.662 .001b 
Residual 4273.411 16 267.088   
Total 14949.838 22    
a. Dependent Variable: LTBV 









t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 64.133 196.048  .327 .748 
SIZE 24.515 23.456 1.027 1.045 .311 
TANG -7.696 2.254 -.572 -3.415 .004 
PROF 2.607 1.492 .389 1.747 .100 
GROW -9.332 24.571 -.383 -.380 .709 
CORD 1.276 1.467 .204 .870 .397 
TAX -.636 2.969 -.061 -.214 .833 












Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .503a .253 -.027 12.36% 
a. Dependent Variable: TDMV 








Square F Sig. 
1 Regressio
n 
828.407 6 138.068 .904 .516b 
Residual 2444.141 16 152.759   
Total 3272.549 22    
a. Dependent Variable: TDMV 
















Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta   
1 (Constant) 29.626 148.264  .200 .844 
SIZE 17.622 17.739 1.577 .993 .335 
TANG -2.423 1.704 -.385 -1.421 .174 
PROF -.869 1.129 -.277 -.770 .453 
GROW -12.515 18.583 -1.098 -.674 .510 
CORD -.377 1.109 -.129 -.340 .738 
TAX -.828 2.245 -.171 -.369 .717 









Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .587a .344 .098 34.05% 
 
a. Dependent Variable: TLMV 













Square F Sig. 
1 Regressio
n 
9731.906 6 1621.984 1.399 .275b 
Residual 18550.852 16 1159.428   
Total 28282.759 22    
a. Dependent Variable: TLMV 









t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 861.098 408.466  2.108 .051 
SIZE 60.554 48.871 1.843 1.239 .233 
TANG -6.626 4.696 -.358 -1.411 .177 
PROF -4.908 3.109 -.532 -1.579 .134 
GROW -77.379 51.194 -2.309 -1.511 .150 
CORD -2.277 3.057 -.265 -.745 .467 
TAX -9.957 6.186 -.698 -1.610 .127 





Table 12: Correlations between dependent variables and determinants of Retail Firms 
 
 
5.3 Food Producers 
 
The Food producing sector analysis comprises of 14 firms listed on the Johannesburg stock 
exchange. Average TDBV increase from 18.97% to 32.61% whilst average TDMV of equity 
increased from 15.55% to 19.20%.  Average TLBV increased from 79.87% to 98.27% whilst 
average TLMV of debt increased from 59.26% to 61.16%. 
Figure 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 below present a graphical representation of the different 
leverage ratios under the period of consideration. Table 13 below presents the different 
leverage rations broken down into yearly increment. 
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Figure 20: Leverage Ratios’ of the Food Producers 
 
 





Figure 22: Total Liabilities to Book value ratio of Food Producers 
 
 





Figure 24: Total Liabilities to Market value of Food Producers 
 
 
Table 13: Yearly Leverage of Food Producers  
  TDBV TLBV TDMV TLMV 
1994 21,30% 82,09% 18,33% 67,13% 
1995 18,45% 77,68% 5,94% 29,08% 
1996 20,84% 79,00% 15,05% 50,67% 
1997 14,26% 76,59% 10,26% 55,66% 
1998 20,02% 83,99% 28,15% 93,79% 
1999 22,88% 81,28% 28,15% 88,97% 
2000 142,19% 285,11% 46,53% 117,07% 
2001 51,20% 150,10% 28,17% 98,39% 
2002 41,13% 133,16% 32,86% 103,61% 
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2003 40,93% 126,36% 38,32% 108,30% 
2004 33,56% 104,49% 33,23% 82,87% 
2005 22,14% 93,92% 12,29% 48,82% 
2006 22,71% 89,25% 12,09% 48,00% 
2007 25,56% 87,38% 11,16% 40,40% 
2008 54,07% 130,76% 28,53% 73,19% 
2009 36,67% 109,62% 40,63% 95,91% 
2010 38,36% 101,70% 37,52% 87,44% 
2011 32,71% 95,09% 28,08% 71,23% 
2012 22,42% 80,78% 17,86% 56,17% 
2013 33,58% 95,57% 22,91% 65,64% 
2014 32,72% 104,02% 18,72% 64,37% 
2015 37,28% 107,19% 16,76% 55,28% 
2016 37,03% 103,80% 19,75% 64,33% 
          
Average 35,74% 107,78% 23,97% 72,45% 
Min 14,26% 76,59% 5,94% 29,08% 
Max 142,19% 285,11% 46,53% 117,07% 
Std Dev 25,44% 43,41% 10,94% 23,47% 






Table 14, 15 and 16 below summarises the descriptive statistics and the correlations 
between the four leverage ratios used as well as the capital structure determinants. The 
average leverage ratio ranges from 23.97% to 107.78% based on the measure of leverage 
used with a standard deviation of between 10.94% and 43.41%. 
Firm size is negatively correlated to TDBV and TLBV and positively correlated to TDMV and 
TLMV. Tangibility is negatively correlated to all four leverage ratios. Profitability is positively 
correlated to TDBV and TLBV but negatively correlated TDMV and TLMV. Growth, cost of 
debt and corporate tax is negatively correlated to all four leverage ratios. None of the 
determinants showed any statistical significance to any of the four leverage ratios. 
 









TDBV 23 14.26% 142.19% 35.74% 25.44% 
TLBV 23 76.59% 285.11% 107.78% 43.41% 
TDMV 23 5.94% 46.53% 23.97% 10.94% 
TLMV 23 29.08% 117.07% 72.45% 23.47% 
SIZE 23 12.81 15.20 14.15% 0.76% 
TANG 23 34.01% 48.42% 41.21% 4.30% 
PROF 23 5.98% 19.64% 11.60% 3.54% 
GROW 23 13.56 15.05 14.22% 0.39% 
CORD 23 8.50% 23.00% 13.36% 4.17% 
TAX 23 28.00% 35.00% 29.96% 2.51% 
Valid N  23     
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Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .641a .411 .190 22.90% 
a. Dependent Variable: TDBV 








Square F Sig. 
1 Regressio
n 
5849.847 6 974.974 1.859 .151b 
Residual 8391.447 16 524.465   
Total 14241.293 22    
a. Dependent Variable: TDBV 

















t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant
) 
914.434 319.957  2.858 .011 
SIZE 14.204 10.762 .422 1.320 .205 
TANG .336 2.225 .057 .151 .882 
PROF -1.546 1.896 -.215 -.815 .427 
GROW -63.039 20.452 -.961 -3.082 .007 
CORD -.993 1.901 -.163 -.522 .609 
TAX -5.534 3.522 -.547 -1.571 .136 









Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .695a .483 .289 36.60952% 
a. Dependent Variable: TLBV 













Square F Sig. 
1 Regressio
n 
20016.238 6 3336.040 2.489 .068b 
Residual 21444.113 16 1340.257   
Total 41460.351 22    
a. Dependent Variable: TLBV 









t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant
) 
1769.254 511.478  3.459 .003 
SIZE 25.230 17.204 .439 1.466 .162 
TANG .182 3.557 .018 .051 .960 
PROF -2.560 3.031 -.209 -.845 .411 
GROW -119.288 32.694 -1.066 -3.649 .002 
CORD -1.514 3.039 -.145 -.498 .625 
TAX -9.332 5.630 -.540 -1.658 .117 











Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .872a .760 .670 6.29% 
a. Dependent Variable: TDMV 








Square F Sig. 
1 Regressio
n 
2000.768 6 333.461 8.435 .000b 
Residual 632.555 16 39.535   
Total 2633.323 22    
a. Dependent Variable: TDMV 


















t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant
) 
569.408 87.846  6.482 .000 
SIZE 4.076 2.955 .281 1.379 .187 
TANG -.432 .611 -.170 -.708 .489 
PROF -2.013 .521 -.652 -3.867 .001 
GROW -33.231 5.615 -1.178 -5.918 .000 
CORD -.324 .522 -.123 -.620 .544 
TAX -2.838 .967 -.652 -2.935 .010 









Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .914a .835 .773 11.18% 
a. Dependent Variable: TLMV 












Square F Sig. 
1 Regressio
n 
10120.411 6 1686.735 13.492 .000b 
Residual 2000.259 16 125.016   
Total 12120.670 22    
a. Dependent Variable: TLMV 









t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant
) 
1259.246 156.213  8.061 .000 
SIZE 15.233 5.254 .490 2.899 .010 
TANG -.619 1.086 -.113 -.570 .577 
PROF -4.044 .926 -.610 -4.369 .000 
GROW -79.235 9.985 -1.309 -7.935 .000 
CORD .207 .928 .037 .223 .827 
TAX -6.870 1.719 -.736 -3.996 .001 




Table 16: Correlations between dependent variables and determinants of Food Producers 
 
 
5.4 Large Caps 
 
The Large Caps comprise of 20 firms listed on the Johannesburg stock exchange. Average 
TDBV increase from 24.16% to 67.23% whilst average TDMV increased from 15.05% to 
36.20%.  Average TLBV increased from 101.66% to 129.20% whilst average TLMV of debt 
decreased from 83.52% to 67.87%. 
Figure 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29 below present a graphical representation of the different 
leverage ratios under the period of consideration. Table 17 below presents the different 
leverage rations broken down into yearly increment. 
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Figure 25: Leverage Ratios’ of Large Caps  
 
 





Figure 27: Total Liabilities to Book Value of Large Caps  
 
 





Figure 29: Total Liabilities to Market Value of Large Caps  
 
 
Table 17: Yearly Leverage for Large Caps 
  TDBV TLBV TDMV TLMV 
1994 30,24% 123,41% 28,67% 185,50% 
1995 20,04% 99,22% 19,90% 138,79% 
1996 25,58% 105,22% 6,82% 28,69% 
1997 20,11% 87,52% 10,91% 31,50% 
1998 24,81% 92,94% 8,93% 33,13% 
1999 88,33% 201,88% 16,26% 44,02% 
2000 70,35% 171,40% 14,30% 40,81% 
2001 51,95% 136,01% 17,31% 48,69% 
2002 42,01% 124,76% 28,95% 67,23% 
2003 48,62% 125,92% 18,24% 51,08% 
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2004 40,93% 120,28% 13,25% 41,46% 
2005 46,21% 128,59% 12,29% 33,75% 
2006 52,35% 121,43% 16,80% 37,20% 
2007 57,07% 123,28% 18,02% 38,36% 
2008 73,09% 149,77% 43,81% 81,96% 
2009 78,86% 149,92% 40,52% 72,21% 
2010 58,04% 120,03% 25,76% 48,55% 
2011 50,52% 111,95% 24,79% 51,07% 
2012 58,78% 124,45% 27,65% 55,31% 
2013 64,35% 124,96% 37,64% 69,88% 
2014 73,24% 136,18% 33,48% 61,40% 
2015 75,56% 137,75% 53,44% 97,49% 
2016 64,23% 122,64% 28,80% 55,29% 
          
Average 52,84% 127,80% 23,76% 61,45% 
Min 20,04% 87,52% 6,82% 28,69% 
Max 88,33% 201,88% 53,44% 185,50% 
Std Dev 19,59% 24,56% 12,01% 36,75% 






Table 18, 19 and 20 below summarises the descriptive statistics and the correlations 
between the four leverage ratios used as well as the capital structure determinants. The 
average leverage ratio ranges from 23.76% to 127.80% based on the measure of leverage 
used with a standard deviation of between 12.01% and 36.75%. 
Firm size is positively correlated to TDBV, TLBV and TDMV but negatively correlated to 
TLMV. TDBV and TDMV showed statistical significance at a 0.01 level. Tangibility is 
positively correlated to TDBV and TLBV and negatively correlated to TDMV and TLMV, all 
with very low statistical significance. Profitability is negatively correlated to all four leverage 
ratios also with very little statistical significance. Growth is positively correlated to TDBV, 
TLBV and TDMV and negatively correlated to TLMV. TDBV and TDMV showed statistical 
significance at the 0.01 level. Cost of debt as well as corporate tax rate is negatively 
correlated to TDBV, TLMV and TDMV and negatively correlated to TLMV. Both leverage 























TDBV 23 20.04% 88.33% 52.84% 19.59% 
TLBV 23 87.52% 201.88% 127.80% 24.56% 
TDMV 23 6.82% 53.44% 23.76% 12.01% 
TLMV 23 28.69% 185.50% 61.45% 36.75% 
SIZE 23 14.73 18.71 16.83% 1.35% 
TANG 23 35.07% 44.13% 38.37% 2.08% 
PROF 23 6.87% 16.98% 12.30% 2.84% 
GROW 23 14.69 19.16 17.01% 1.48% 
CORD 23 8.50% 23.00% 13.36% 4.17% 
TAX 23 28.00% 35.00% 29.96% 2.51% 
Valid N  23     
 








Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .798a .637 .501 13.84% 
a. Dependent Variable: TDBV 










Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 5375.552 6 895.925 4.674 .006b 
Residual 3066.794 16 191.675   
Total 8442.346 22    
a. Dependent Variable: TDBV 








t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 212.036 212.265  .999 .333 
SIZE -58.853 67.354 -4.045 -.874 .395 
TANG 2.287 1.764 .243 1.297 .213 
PROF .367 1.467 .053 .250 .806 
GROW 53.401 60.512 4.025 .882 .391 
CORD -.989 1.274 -.210 -.776 .449 
TAX -5.216 2.434 -.669 -2.144 .048 











Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .619a .383 .152 22.61% 
a. Dependent Variable: TLBV 








Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 5088.516 6 848.086 1.659 .195b 
Residual 8180.613 16 511.288   
Total 13269.129 22    
a. Dependent Variable: TLBV 


















t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 718.907 346.681  2.074 .055 
SIZE -120.004 110.005 -6.580 -1.091 .291 
TANG 3.340 2.881 .283 1.160 .263 
PROF .642 2.396 .074 .268 .792 
GROW 94.064 98.830 5.655 .952 .355 
CORD -2.502 2.081 -.425 -1.202 .247 
TAX -9.159 3.975 -.937 -2.305 .035 









Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .775a .601 .451 8.90% 
a. Dependent Variable: TDMV 














Square F Sig. 
1 Regressio
n 
1907.798 6 317.966 4.015 .012b 
Residual 1267.231 16 79.202   
Total 3175.029 22    
a. Dependent Variable: TDMV 









t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant
) 
-19.018 136.447  -.139 .891 
SIZE -33.904 43.296 -3.800 -.783 .445 
TANG -.475 1.134 -.082 -.419 .681 
PROF -.979 .943 -.231 -1.038 .315 
GROW 36.699 38.898 4.511 .943 .359 
CORD -.284 .819 -.099 -.347 .733 
TAX .771 1.564 .161 .493 .629 











Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .614a .377 .144 34.01% 
a. Dependent Variable: TLMV 








Square F Sig. 
1 Regressio
n 
11208.074 6 1868.012 1.615 .207b 
Residual 18511.893 16 1156.993   
Total 29719.967 22    
a. Dependent Variable: TLMV 


















t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant
) 
22.504 521.510  .043 .966 
SIZE 28.582 165.480 1.047 .173 .865 
TANG -4.190 4.333 -.238 -.967 .348 
PROF -6.378 3.604 -.493 -1.770 .096 
GROW -26.054 148.670 -1.047 -.175 .863 
CORD -3.874 3.131 -.440 -1.237 .234 
TAX 9.752 5.979 .667 1.631 .122 















Table 20: Correlations between dependent variables and determinants of Large Caps 
 
 
Table 21 below summarise the analysis of the different measures of leverage and how each 
sector under consideration has changed. Larges capitalisation stocks reflected the highest 
increase in TDBV, TDMV as well as TLBV whilst food producers reflected the highest 
















Total Sample Average (1994 to 1998) Average (2012 to 2016) Increase/Decrease
TDBV 19,36% 47,65% 146,13%
TDMV 13,40% 26,26% 95,97%
TLBV 94,41% 127,50% 35,05%
TLMV 68,56% 71,63% 4,48%
Retail Average (1994 to 1998) Average (2012 to 2016) Increase/Decrease
TDBV 19,70% 43,58% 121,22%
TDMV 9,45% 15,77% 66,88%
TLBV 129,90% 148,87% 14,60%
TLMV 88,28% 66,90% -24,22%
Food Producers Average (1994 to 1998) Average (2012 to 2016) Increase/Decrease
TDBV 18,97% 32,61% 71,90%
TDMV 15,55% 19,20% 23,47%
TLBV 79,87% 98,27% 23,04%
TLMV 59,26% 61,16% 3,21%
Large Caps Average (1994 to 1998) Average (2012 to 2016) Increase/Decrease
TDBV 24,16% 67,23% 178,27%
TDMV 15,05% 36,20% 140,53%
TLBV 101,66% 129,20% 27,09%
TLMV 83,52% 67,87% -18,74%
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5.5 Debt and Liabilities  
 
Table 22 as well as Figures 30 and 31 below illustrate the change in the use of short term 
versus long term debt as well as the change in current versus non-current liabilities. The 
results include the total sample of 68 firms as well as the subcategories.   
There has been a clear move on the balance sheet of these listed firms over the last two 
decades. Short term to long term debt has been equally distributed from 1994 to 208 but 
since the financial crisis in 2008 there has been a clear shift to the use of long term debt 
over short term debt. Food producing firms have however seen a shift back to their inherit 
equilibrium of 50% short term to long term debt since the financial crises of 2008. This has 
been the only subsection that has shown this trend. 
Current to Non-Current liabilities has seen a narrowing of dispersion over the last two 
decades from 80:20 current to non-current in 1994, to 55:45 current to non-current in 2016. 
This has been evident in all subcategories and this change seems to be robust except for 
Large Cap stocks which are illustrating some dispersion since the end of the financial crises.  
 
Table 22: Change in the use of Debt and Liabilities on balance sheet  
        
ST Debt to 
Total Debt










1994 56,40% 43,60% 80,79% 19,21%
1995 54,79% 45,21% 82,07% 17,93%
1996 44,94% 55,06% 80,64% 19,36%
1997 50,09% 49,91% 79,00% 21,00%
1998 41,75% 58,25% 75,94% 24,06%
1999 54,11% 45,89% 73,90% 26,10%
2000 50,69% 49,31% 71,96% 28,04%
2001 45,23% 54,77% 71,34% 28,66%
2002 44,89% 55,11% 67,19% 32,81%
2003 49,62% 50,38% 69,05% 30,95%
2004 50,78% 49,22% 67,69% 32,31%
2005 52,55% 47,45% 67,21% 32,79%
2006 41,50% 58,50% 64,17% 35,83%
2007 49,36% 50,64% 66,45% 33,55%
2008 47,00% 53,00% 64,20% 35,80%
2009 39,43% 60,57% 60,02% 39,98%
2010 38,49% 61,51% 61,00% 39,00%
2011 43,33% 56,67% 60,63% 39,37%
2012 38,06% 61,94% 59,04% 40,96%
2013 35,27% 64,73% 57,23% 42,77%
2014 36,93% 63,07% 58,35% 41,65%
2015 32,46% 67,54% 55,20% 44,80%
2016 34,94% 65,06% 54,87% 45,13%
Average 44,90% 55,10% 67,30% 32,70%
Min 32,46% 43,60% 54,87% 17,93%
Max 56,40% 67,54% 82,07% 45,13%
Std Dev 6,96% 6,96% 8,48% 8,48%
Range 23,94% 23,94% 27,20% 27,20%
Total Sample
ST Debt to 
Total Debt










1994 54,28% 45,72% 86,92% 13,08%
1995 46,55% 53,45% 88,99% 11,01%
1996 41,49% 58,51% 89,73% 10,27%
1997 58,54% 41,46% 89,38% 10,62%
1998 44,94% 55,06% 85,94% 14,06%
1999 61,60% 38,40% 83,91% 16,09%
2000 55,73% 44,27% 82,92% 17,08%
2001 40,01% 59,99% 80,88% 19,12%
2002 41,25% 58,75% 76,10% 23,90%
2003 38,64% 61,36% 78,20% 21,80%
2004 42,96% 57,04% 78,97% 21,03%
2005 46,61% 53,39% 76,66% 23,34%
2006 31,60% 68,40% 77,11% 22,89%
2007 38,23% 61,77% 79,09% 20,91%
2008 38,45% 61,55% 75,70% 24,30%
2009 30,83% 69,17% 73,54% 26,46%
2010 33,27% 66,73% 74,37% 25,63%
2011 40,36% 59,64% 73,54% 26,46%
2012 29,56% 70,44% 70,12% 29,88%
2013 34,78% 65,22% 71,43% 28,57%
2014 35,79% 64,21% 69,06% 30,94%
2015 28,64% 71,36% 66,68% 33,32%
2016 37,94% 62,06% 65,64% 34,36%
Average 41,39% 58,61% 78,04% 21,96%
Min 28,64% 38,40% 65,64% 10,27%
Max 61,60% 71,36% 89,73% 34,36%
Std Dev 9,13% 9,13% 7,17% 7,17%




         
 
Figure 30: Change in Short Term vs. Long Term Debt 
   
   
 
 
ST Debt to 
Total Debt










1994 62,25% 37,75% 87,39% 12,61%
1995 70,39% 29,61% 85,98% 14,02%
1996 64,73% 35,27% 82,22% 17,78%
1997 47,64% 52,36% 82,59% 17,41%
1998 52,44% 47,56% 77,75% 22,25%
1999 50,62% 49,38% 75,15% 24,85%
2000 47,95% 52,05% 72,39% 27,61%
2001 49,80% 50,20% 70,72% 29,28%
2002 57,44% 42,56% 68,34% 31,66%
2003 59,26% 40,74% 70,83% 29,17%
2004 61,53% 38,47% 62,28% 37,72%
2005 59,09% 40,91% 61,68% 38,32%
2006 61,68% 38,32% 61,83% 38,17%
2007 62,91% 37,09% 62,15% 37,85%
2008 66,26% 33,74% 64,39% 35,61%
2009 57,38% 42,62% 63,89% 36,11%
2010 65,05% 34,95% 69,27% 30,73%
2011 60,65% 39,35% 64,07% 35,93%
2012 68,33% 31,67% 67,77% 32,23%
2013 49,83% 50,17% 57,84% 42,16%
2014 50,89% 49,11% 63,45% 36,55%
2015 49,27% 50,73% 56,67% 43,33%
2016 40,70% 59,30% 55,48% 44,52%
Average 57,22% 42,78% 68,88% 31,12%
Min 40,70% 29,61% 55,48% 12,61%
Max 70,39% 59,30% 87,39% 44,52%
Std Dev 7,81% 7,81% 9,24% 9,24%
Range 29,69% 29,69% 31,91% 31,91%
Food Producers
ST Debt to 
Total Debt










1994 62,40% 37,60% 70,90% 29,10%
1995 56,39% 43,61% 74,91% 25,09%
1996 39,14% 60,86% 72,69% 27,31%
1997 48,52% 51,48% 70,21% 29,79%
1998 41,83% 58,17% 68,49% 31,51%
1999 43,16% 56,84% 62,23% 37,77%
2000 47,18% 52,82% 63,79% 36,21%
2001 47,80% 52,20% 62,83% 37,17%
2002 44,85% 55,15% 61,00% 39,00%
2003 51,29% 48,71% 63,50% 36,50%
2004 48,24% 51,76% 61,83% 38,17%
2005 41,71% 58,29% 58,43% 41,57%
2006 39,39% 60,61% 55,79% 44,21%
2007 50,22% 49,78% 59,80% 40,20%
2008 41,76% 58,24% 53,54% 46,46%
2009 33,65% 66,35% 50,71% 49,29%
2010 31,22% 68,78% 49,25% 50,75%
2011 35,06% 64,94% 51,45% 48,55%
2012 32,24% 67,76% 49,69% 50,31%
2013 24,40% 75,60% 46,77% 53,23%
2014 28,00% 72,00% 46,79% 53,21%
2015 22,32% 77,68% 42,35% 57,65%
2016 26,99% 73,01% 43,77% 56,23%
Average 40,77% 59,23% 58,29% 41,71%
Min 22,32% 37,60% 42,35% 25,09%
Max 62,40% 77,68% 74,91% 57,65%
Std Dev 10,35% 10,35% 9,59% 9,59%




Figure 31: Change in Current vs. Non-Current Liabilities 
   















The purpose of this paper was to determine how corporate debt levels have changed in 
South Africa from 1994 through 2016 given the drastic changes in the South African 
economic climate over the past three decades, as well as to determine which drivers of 
capital structure are most significant. A total of 68 firms from three different sectors namely 
large capitalisation stocks, retail firms and food producers, were sampled. This paper forms 
part of a larger study thus other sectors will be covered by different authors.  
This paper made use of four different measures of leverage namely debt to book value of 
equity, debt to market value of equity, total liabilities to book values of equity and lastly debt 
to market value of equity. Six determinants of capital structure namely size, tangibility of 
assets, profitability, growth, cost of raising debt and the corporate tax rate were used to 
measure their significance in the capital structure decision making of South African 
corporates. 
Over the period of consideration we have seen some structural changes in the South African 
economy which forms the backdrop of this study. Since the end of apartheid we have seen 
a lifting of sanctions against South Africa by some of the world’s largest economies such as 
USA, Japan and Europe. This has allowed South African firms to compete again on a global 
scale and in turn has drastically increased the possibilities and scope for South African 
corporates.  
Secondly we have seen the BESA receive their licence in 1996 and in turn have grown to 
the largest bond exchange on the continent with over R2 trillion bonds in issue. This has 
drastically increased the accessibility to capital for South African corporates.  
Thirdly we have seen a drastic decrease in the cost of lending in South Africa. The yield on 
South African long term bonds has decreased from 18.3% in 1998 to an average yield of 
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8.3% from 2010 onwards. This has made raising capital in terms of bond issuance much 
more attractive for these corporates.  
The analysis of the results nonetheless confirmed the hypnotises that these structural 
changes in the South African economy would drastically increase the attractiveness as well 
as willingness for South African Corporates to increase their use of debt. It is however 
evident by the results that all firms have increased their use of debt using some aggregate 
measure of leverage. Large capitalisation stocks have seen the largest increase in their use 
of debt. This is in line with the Frank and Goyal (2009) study which showed that larger firms 
with more diverse income streams tend to have a greater appetite for debt. Further 
reiterating this hypothesis is the fact that South African corporates have been granted much 
broader opportunities since the end of apartheid and lifting of sanctions which would have 
benefited the capabilities and financial strength of larger firms.  
The analysis of the study also revealed that South African corporates have increased their 
use of long term debt in respect to short term debt under the period of consideration. This 
change has been rather robust after the 2008 financial crises. The decrease in the long bond 
rate of South Africa could possibly explain this trend but deeper study into the different 
maturities of corporate debt would be needed to get to an accurate conclusion.  
Current liabilities in respect to non-Current liabilities have seen a convergence to a more 
equal distribution between these two balance sheet sections.  This again confirms the 
analysis that firms have drastically increased their use of long term debt in respect to short 
term debt. Shorter term maturities have been swapped for longer term maturities which in 
turn has increased non-current liabilities and decreased current liabilities resulting in the 





The analysis of capital structure determinants yielded the following results: 
• Firm size showed statistical significance under TDBV, TLBV, TDMV but limited 
significance under TLMV. It is thus possible to conclude that large firms tend to use 
more debt. This is in line with the study conducted by Frank and Goyal (2009). Larger 
firms tend to have more diversified income streams therein decreasing their risk. 
Larger firms also have increased opportunities domestically and globally which 
should increase their appetite for debt to fund these projects.  
• Tangibility of assets was found to be negatively correlated to all leverage measures 
but none showed statistical significance. This contradicts the trade-off theory as 
alluded to by Jense and Mekling (1976) as well as Pandy (2001) but is in agreement 
with the pecking order theory.  
• Profitability reflected mixed results with no statistical significance. Profitability also 
showed a positive correlation to both book value ratios and negative correlation to 
market value ratios.  
• Growth reflected a positive correlation and showed statistical significance to all 
leverage measures. This supports the Pandy (2001) study. Firms in a high growth 
phase need to fund their underlying asset base to keep up with demand. 
• Cost of debt showed a negative correlation as well as statistical significance. This 
supports the hypothesis that if cost of debt decreases it increases the attractiveness 
of debt financing and vice versa.  
• Corporate tax rate reflected a negative correlation as well as statistical significance. 
This is not aligned with the Gropp and Ebril (1997) study which showed that an 
increase in corporate tax rate would increase leverage as firms would put more 




To conclude this study it was found that corporates have increased their use of debt since 
1994. The main drivers of this reform were the lifting of sanctions against South African 
corporates, the founding of the Bond Exchange of South Africa which increased the 
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Share name Ticker Industry Share name Ticker Industry
British American Tobacco BTI Tobacco Truw orths International Limited TRU General Retailers
AB InBev ANB Beverages Imperial Holdings Limited IPL General Retailers
Naspers Limited NPN Media Pick N Pay Stores Limited PIK Food & Drug Retailers
Glencore Plc GLN Mining Advtech Limited ADH General Retailers
Compagnie Financiere Richemont SA CFR Personal Goods African And Overseas Enterprises Limited AOO General Retailers
BHP Billiton Plc BIL Industrial Metals & Mining Alert Steel Holdings Limited AET General Retailers
Anglo American Plc AGL Mining Cashbuild Limited CSB General Retailers
Steinhoff International Holdings NV SNH Personal Goods Choppies Enterprises Limited CHP General Retailers
MTN Group Limited MTN Mobile Telecommunications Combined Motor Holdings Limited CMH General Retailers
Vodacom Group Limited VOD Mobile Telecommunications Command Holdings Limited CMA General Retailers
Sasol Limited SOL Oil & Gas Producers Curro Holdings Limited COH General Retailers
South32 Limited S32 Industrial Metals & Mining Holdsport Limited HSP General Retailers
Aspen Pharmacare Holdings APN Pharmaceuticals Homechoice International Plc HIL General Retailers
Mediclinic International Limited MEI Health Care Italtile Limited ITE General Retailers
Mondi Limited MND Forestry & Paper Lew is Group Limited LEW General Retailers
Shoprite Holdings Limited SHP Food & Drug Retailers Rex Trueform Clothing Company Ltd RTO General Retailers
Anglo American Platinium Limited AMS Mining Super Group Limited SPG General Retailers
Tiger Brands Limited TBS Food Producers Verimark Holdings Limited VMK General Retailers
Woolw orths Holdings Limited WHL General Retailers Massmart Holdings Limited MSM Food & Drug Retailers
Anglogold Ashanti Limited ANG Mining Pick N Pay Holdings Limited PWK Food & Drug Retailers
Kumba Iron Ore Limited KIO Industrial Metals & Mining AH-Vest Limited AHL Food Producers
The Bidvest Group Limited BVT General Industrials Dis-Chem Pharmacies DCP Food & Drug Retailers
Sappi Limited SAP Forestry & Paper Astral Foods Limited ARL Food Producers
Netcare Limited NTC Health Care AVI Limited AVI Food Producers
Mr Price Group Limited MRP General Retailers Aw ethu Brew eries Limited AWT Food Producers
Assore Limited ASR Industrial Metals & Mining Clover Industries Limited CLR Food Producers
Pioneer Food Group Limited PFG Food Producers Crookes Brothers Limited CKS Food Producers
Gold Fields Limited GFI Mining Nutritional Holdings Limited NUT Food Producers
Telkom SA SOC Limited TKG Fixed Line Telecommunications Oceana Group Limited OCE Food Producers
Impala Platinum Holdings Limited IMP Mining Quantum Food Holdings Limited QFH Food Producers
Life Healthcare Group Holdings Ltd LHC Health Care RCL Foods Limited RCL Food Producers
The SPAR Group Limited SPP Food & Drug Retailers Rhodes Food Group Holdings Limited RFG Food Producers
Mondi Plc MNP General Industrials Sovereign Food Investments Limited SOV Food Producers
The Foschini Group Limited TFG General Retailers Tongaat Hulett Limited TON Food Producers
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Appendix A-5 Large Cap Results 
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